Many European leaders are in a bind. They find themselves dependent on the security guarantees of a United States president who backs political parties that pose the greatest threat to their own political survival. Skilled diplomacy, increased defense spending, and flattery have thus far prevented a catastrophe in Ukraine. But European leaders, preoccupied with short-term political emergencies sparked by the White House, are missing a deeper and longer-term challenge: the ideological one.
“European leaders are missing a deeper and longer-term challenge: the ideological one”
Talking with the thinkers and politicians of the “new right” movement reveals that it is transatlantic and, above all, a current political phenomenon. The recently published National Security Strategy of the Trump administration accuses traditional European governments of inviting the “civilizational erasure” and the “subversion of democratic processes”. It notes their determination to “foster resistance” in Europe by working with MAGA supporters on the continent, from Reform UK to the Alternative for Germany (AfD).
In Europe, as in the United States, the starting point of this movement is a critique of liberalism and the globalization unleashed after the Cold War. It asserts that this has left citizens at the mercy of a series of crises: the 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 migration crisis, the 2020 pandemic, and the rise in the cost of living following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Each successive crisis weakened the liberal center by surpassing the state and sowing doubt about which side it was on.
The new right, on both sides of the Atlantic, has sought to build a new social base by drawing in those left on the wrong side of these crises: often working-class voters who have suffered a relative loss of status and wealth. This appeal is reflected in a radical political agenda—on immigration, trade, foreign policy, and the reinvention of the state—linked to the idea of recreating a national identity. Border control can be used to determine who is an authentic citizen and who should be expelled. Tariffs can be employed to rebuild a national production economy centered on the dignity of work. Foreign policy is reframed around a narrowly defined national interest. And all this is made possible by attacking the “deep state” and the “experts” who sustained the liberal agenda.
To convey their message, the new right has exploited the fragmentation of the public sphere into disconnected digital tribes. New parties shun traditional media and have come to dominate the new information space, whether on TikTok or Telegram. Figures such as Elon Musk and J.D. Vance use social media as a megaphone to back far-right parties or leaders once considered unacceptable, from the AfD to Tommy Robinson. They employ an “armed” definition of freedom of expression that does not distinguish between facts and falsehoods, in order to flood the space with their causes.
Thus, in Europe as in the United States, the new right has a narrative, a social base, a political agenda, and communication channels to prosper. And the European and American branches of the new right are cooperating to shape that new policy.
“How should traditional European leaders respond?”
How should traditional European leaders respond? First, they must develop a counter-narrative, a social base, an agenda, and a communication strategy of their own, aimed at working-class voters. There is no perfect answer, but there are several positive examples. In Denmark, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, aSocial Democrat, has laid down solid ground to counter the right on migration. Rather than mimic the right’s racially charged attacks, she reframed the migration question as an argument for how to better defend the welfare state. In the Netherlands, Rob Jetten led his progressive D66 party from fifth place to the top by winning over centrists and conservatives with a message of hope and reclaiming the Dutch flag from populists.
Second, traditional European leaders can take advantage of the fact that it is possible to breach the “transatlantic membrane” by using Donald Trump as a weapon against the Euro-MAGA current. Mark Carney and Anthony Albanese charted the path in Canada and Australia, respectively. They quickly understood that populist tribunes can no longer present themselves merely as nationalist challengers when they are part of a transnational revolutionary movement.
Some populists, such as Nigel Farage of Reform UK and Jordan Bardella of the National Rally in France, have begun to dissociate themselves from Trump, though the fact that their policies resemble those of the world’s most powerful leader gives them certain incumbency drawbacks, and they need to explain where they stand on his policies. Brexit proved to be a heavy burden for the European hard right when the damages of leaving the EU became clear. Surveys by the European Council on Foreign Relations show that the same could happen to the ties between the movement and Trump, as large majorities in Europe view his re-election as a negative for their countries.
“Trump could be a catalyst for a new European centrist politics”
Smart European leaders explain that the steps they are taking to appease Trump—from boosting defense spending to reducing Europe’s energy dependence on Russia—are things they would need to do anyway. And they are right. But the same logic applies to what they must do to respond to the European MAGA. The European right can draw inspiration from Trump, but their long-term challenge to the continent’s establishment has emerged on the ground, out of Europe’s real needs. By defending national sovereignty against the assaults of the American leader, liberal European leaders can rebuild support in communities that have felt forgotten for a long time and find solutions to problems that have grown unchecked. If they do so, Trump will not be merely a populist flare-up. He will also be a catalyst for a new European centrist politics.
