From Justice Thomas’s statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Novotny v. Moore:
Maryland stands among several states that bar law-abiding gun owners from carrying firearms in a broad range of public settings. Under Maryland law, a person may not carry a firearm in public demonstrations, on mass transit, at amusement venues, within healthcare facilities, at sites that sell alcohol for on-site consumption, and across tens of thousands of acres of state park and forest land. The Fourth Circuit defended these prohibitions against the petitioners’ Second Amendment challenges, concluding that each statute prohibits firearms in a ‘sensitive place.’
I question whether each of these laws “is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” in “sensitive places.” Nevertheless, I concur with the Court’s decision not to grant certiorari. Because each Maryland statute touches a distinct historical tradition of firearm regulation, the breadth of petitioners’ challenge would complicate our review. In an appropriate and more narrowly focused case, however, we should examine the scope of States’ authority to ban firearms in “sensitive places.”
The Second Amendment protects the people’s “inherent” right to keep and bear firearms, a right that admits of only historically grounded exceptions. Before and after the founding, it was well understood that individuals possessed a natural right to keep and bear arms, which included the ability to carry firearms in public spaces for self-defense. The Constitution “codified [that] pre-existing right.” The early generations after the founding recognized the breadth of the Second Amendment’s “guarante[e],” and “those who sought to carry firearms publicly and peaceably in antebellum America were generally free to do so.” Thus, when a State seeks to restrict the right to bear arms—including by limiting where a law-abiding citizen may carry his firearm—the State must ground its regulation in the Second Amendment’s “historical understanding” by “demonstrat[ing] that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
This Court has previously acknowledged a limited tradition of States’ regulating the right to carry firearms in certain “sensitive places.” In Bruen, we noted that early American legislatures sometimes prohibited weapons in “legislative assemblies, polling places, and courthouses.” But we emphasized that this tradition was narrow. “[T]he historical record yields relatively few 18th- and 19th-century ‘sensitive places’ where weapons were altogether prohibited.” While “courts can use analogies to those historical regulations of ‘sensitive places’ to determine that modern regulations … are constitutionally permissible,” “expanding the category of ‘sensitive places’ … to all places of public congregation … would eviscerate the general right to publicly carry arms for self-defense.”
Nevertheless, States have seized on the idea of “sensitive places” to prohibit the peaceable carry of firearms in locations that bear little resemblance to legislatures, polling places, or courthouses. New Jersey, for example, prohibits firearms in at least 25 locations, including zoos, public libraries, casinos, and state-owned beaches. New York has designated 20 locations as “sensitive,” ranging from “any place of worship” to “residential settings licensed … by the department of health.” California’s 29 gun-free spaces include “athletic facilit[ies],” “financial institution[s],” and any government-permitted “public gathering or special event.” {Several other States ban firearms in many public places.} These restrictions stand on questionable historical ground. And, their cumulative effect is to prohibit firearms wherever people gather for eating, drinking, recreation, amusement, and free speech—an affront to the right of “law-abiding citizens” to “carr[y] arms in public for” their “ordinary self-defense.”
The lower courts have largely blessed these ahistorical ventures. The Fourth Circuit below upheld all but one of Maryland’s locational restrictions. A now-vacated decision of the Third Circuit upheld many of New Jersey’s “sensitive-place” laws. Courts of Appeals have also rejected challenges to specific locational restrictions in New York, California, and Hawaii.
I harbor serious doubts that our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation supports many of these sweeping restrictions. In an appropriate case, this Court should consider whether particular sensitive-place laws are consistent with the right to public carry.