A section from the ruling issued yesterday by Judge Andrew Carter of the Southern District of New York in Roe v. Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai:
For the purposes of evaluating the Motion to Dismiss, the allegations in the Complaint are treated as true.
During Jane Roe’s final semester as a medical student at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai (the “Defendant”), she reported that a male classmate, John Doe, had sexually assaulted her in a campus residence hall. Following an inquiry, the Defendant determined John Doe was responsible for the sexual assault and imposed a twenty-month suspension. The written finding of responsibility explained that the suspension was appropriate “[b]ecause the assault did not involve forcible rape or penetration; occurred while the Respondent was under the influence of alcohol; and because there was no evidence presented to the panel of any similar or related acts when the Respondent was not inebriated,” noting that the suspension would provide John Doe the “opportunity to complete his medical training.”
The Plaintiff appealed the sanction selected by the Defendant and challenged the factors used by the Defendant to reach its decision. In response, the Defendant stood by its prior ruling.
The Plaintiff brought claims under Title IX, and the court rejected her petition; some excerpts:
Although a Plaintiff who served as the reporting party in the underlying disciplinary proceedings is not categorically barred from pursuing an erroneous outcome or selective enforcement claim, the Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the applicable standard. First, the Plaintiff agrees with the outcome of the underlying proceedings and thus does not allege that the outcome was “erroneous.” The Plaintiff also fails to provide a relative comparator, which is fatal to her selective enforcement claim.
The Plaintiff’s remaining claims are no more persuasive. She has not alleged circumstances that would permit an inference of discrimination on account of her sex or gender. She relies on assertions that the male perpetrator was favored, but she supplies no link between either party’s gender and the alleged bias.
Finally, the Plaintiff’s hostile environment claim fails because her allegations do not demonstrate that the Defendant did not “adequately respond” to a hostile educational environment.
Here is a portion of the hostile environment analysis:
Plaintiff’s hostile environment claim also fails. To plead a hostile environment under Title IX, a Plaintiff must plausibly allege “that [s]he subjectively perceived the environment to be hostile or abusive and that the environment objectively was hostile or abusive, that is, that it was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] educational environment.” In order to hold an educational institution liable for a hostile educational environment, the Plaintiff must also show “that a school official with ‘authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures’ had ‘actual knowledge’ of the discrimination and failed to adequately respond.”
Even assuming that the Plaintiff satisfies both the objective and subjective standards, the claim fails because the Plaintiff does not allege that the Defendant “failed to adequately respond.” … An educational institution need only “take[] timely and reasonable measures to end the harassment”; the measures need not be ultimately effective, only “taken in good faith.”
The Plaintiff does not plead sufficient facts to show that the remedy was “clearly unreasonable” or not issued in good faith. Institutions are accorded latitude in fashioning remedies. It is well established that “courts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators.” Administrators are not required to impose a particular disciplinary action, including expulsion or no proximity orders.
In this case, the administrators clearly articulated their reasoning for the sanctions imposed. They referred to the relevant policies; explained why one policy was referenced more heavily than another; described that the panel “weighed many factors,” naming six such factors; and identified the circumstances that justified the sanctions, with a clear logical connection between the facts and the remedy. The Court therefore concludes that the remedy was not “clearly unreasonable.”
The hostile environment claim also fails because the Plaintiff does not plead the existence of a hostile environment after the remedy was issued. Merely a “foreseeable risk of ongoing proximity” is insufficient to establish a hostile environment. The Plaintiff offers no support for the proposition that a risk of proximity constitutes “severe or pervasive” “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Moreover, the Plaintiff is not “vulnerable to” harassment solely due to the risk of proximity, particularly when the male student is subject to a no-contact order….
Jeffrey P. Metzler and Max A. Winograd (Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP) represent defendant.
