Friedrich Merz now has a 50% probability of remaining in the Chancellery until May 2029, versus a 50% chance of stepping down before the office, according to the latest update from The Forecasting Machine. The move is sizeable, so it is necessary to explain its causes. Immediately after the last elections in the state of Saxony-Anhalt, Merz’s continuity stood at 60%, supported by a modest improvement in economic prospects and the incentives that the CDU/CSU and the SPD have to avoid a government crisis.
Those incentives still exist. The AfD hovers around 28% in national polls, while the CDU/CSU moves around 20% and the SPD around 12%. Calling federal elections now would expose the two governing partners to a heavy punishment. The result last Sunday in Saxony-Anhalt has made that risk even more visible.
But it has also worsened Merz’s personal position within that same equation. The coalition may want to avoid elections and, at the same time, reach the conclusion that it needs another candidate to face the almost three years remaining in the legislature.
Saxony-Anhalt takes the crisis to the CDU
The AfD obtained 43.8% of the votes in Saxony-Anhalt and 39 of the 83 seats in the regional Parliament. The CDU fell to 17.2%, roughly half its 2021 result, and the SPD secured 9.3%.
“The coalition may want to avoid elections and, at the same time, reach the conclusion that it needs another candidate to face the almost three years remaining in the legislature”
For Merz, the federal dimension of the result is hard to dodge. Until now, a large part of the government’s deterioration could be measured through polls, popularity indices, or intra-coalition disputes. Saxony-Anhalt marks a defeat of great importance for the CDU.
It also affects the strategy with which Merz has tried to contain the AfD. From the Chancellery and the CDU leadership’s side, the rhetoric on immigration and security has hardened without abandoning the Brandmauer, the German firewall that prevents political cooperation with the radical right. The regional result does not, on its own, prove that strategy has failed nationwide, but it does increase the pressure among those who believe the CDU is not reclaiming voters along that path.
The Chancellor’s personal situation does not help either. A Forsa/RTL poll from September 1 indicates 85% dissatisfaction with Merz. The criticisms also extend to his own political space. Before the elections, CDU leaders in Saxony-Anhalt were already willing to demand accountability from Merz if the party suffered a severe defeat, and other conservative voices openly spoke of a loss of authority and unkept promises.
“To reach 2029 he needs the CDU to continue considering more costly to replace him than to keep him”
Merz rules out leaving. After the elections he met with the CDU leadership and announced that he would maintain the reformist course of the government. His willingness to continue, however, only resolves part of the problem. To reach 2029 he needs the CDU to continue considering more costly to replace him than to keep him.
The fear of elections sustains the government
The grand coalition still possesses significant safeguards. One of them is enshrined in the German Basic Law. A motion of no confidence can only succeed if the Bundestag also elects a new chancellor by an absolute majority. This procedure prevents a negative majority from toppling a government without a ready replacement.
Only one constructive motion of no confidence has ever succeeded since the founding of the Federal Republic: in 1982, when Helmut Kohl replaced Helmut Schmidt. The German experience also includes chancellors who endured long periods of unpopularity or succession disputes without being removed immediately.
The current composition of the Bundestag makes a break particularly difficult. While CDU/CSU, SPD and the rest of the parties maintain the refusal to cooperate with the AfD, options are scarce. An early election is not appealing with the current polls.
The AfD’s advance thus exerts two different pressures on Merz. Every new rise in the AfD weakens the argument that his government is managing to contain the radical right, but at the same time it makes it riskier for the CDU and SPD to go to the polls again. This combination has helped keep together a coalition with ongoing disagreements over pensions, health care, taxes, migration or energy policy within the German government.
Saxony-Anhalt does not remove that protection mechanism. It simply reduces the link between coalition stability and the continuity of the chancellor.
A replacement within the same majority
The CDU has, at least on paper, another exit. It could replace Merz while keeping the agreement with the SPD. That option would avoid immediate elections and allow presenting the change as an attempt to relaunch the legislature.
“Each new growth of the AfD weakens the argument that his government is managing to contain the radical right”
Hendrik Wüst, the Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, has been appearing for months in the speculation about a possible succession. A YouGov poll at the end of August placed Wüst ahead of Merz among those expressing a preference, though a broad majority did not lean toward either of the two.
The most likely scenario for now is that there is no organized operation to replace the chancellor. Nor is a poor poll or a regional defeat enough to trigger a replacement. The CDU would have to agree on a successor, persuade the parliamentary group and secure the SPD’s cooperation to maintain the majority.
Upcoming regional elections can influence that calculus. Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania vote on September 20. If the CDU regresses again, it will be harder to present Saxony-Anhalt as a result atypical explained by non-structural factors. Another loss of this kind would further increase the pressure on Merz.
The SPD also needs to decide to what extent it benefits from continuing to be allied with Merz. After the AfD’s victory, the Social Democrats have called for a review of some of the government’s economic and social plans. With national support near 12%, a split that leads to elections would be especially dangerous for the party. Accepting another CDU chancellor would be less costly if the cohabitation with Merz continued to deteriorate.
That is why an eventual exit of the chancellor does not necessarily require that the grand coalition has ceased to be useful for its two members. It could happen precisely because both want to preserve it.
An economic improvement still insufficient
The economy gives Merz some arguments to ask for time. The manufacturing PMI has improved, investor expectations have improved, and the government has approved economic, fiscal and health measures despite disagreements among its partners.
“An eventual exit of the chancellor does not require necessarily that the grand coalition has ceased to be useful to its two members”
These are favorable signals after several years of stagnation, but they are still far from a recovery capable of alone changing the political climate. Germany continues to grapple with investment problems, high energy costs, aging, bureaucracy and loss of industrial competitiveness, especially against China.
The German economist Peter Bofinger recently noted in Agenda Pública that the response cannot be reduced to tax cuts and requires more investment, innovation and productive transformation. The easing of the debt brake and the increase in spending on infrastructure and defense allow mobilizing resources that were previously constrained.
The government needs that effort to begin translating into growth, employment and investment. If that happens, Merz will be able to tell his party that changing the chancellor in the middle of the term would be taking a risk just as the first measures start to work. If the improvement remains limited to some leading indicators, the CDU will have less reason to attribute political value to it.
Merz loses his main advantage
So far, one of the best reasons to back Merz’s continuity was that none of the alternatives appeared clearly better for those who could push him out. Early elections would hurt the CDU and SPD; there was no other viable parliamentary majority; and an internal replacement could add more instability without solving the electoral problems of the two parties.
Part of that logic remains intact. Hence a 50% chance of ending the legislature remains a perfectly plausible scenario. Germany maintains institutions designed to favor continuity and Merz continues to formally control both the Chancellery and his party.
What has changed after Saxony-Anhalt is the relative cost of keeping him. The CDU has just suffered a historic defeat while the AfD advances and the Chancellor records extraordinarily low levels of popularity. If that pattern continues in upcoming regional elections, the party will need to decide whether to reach 2029 in better shape with Merz or replacing him earlier.
To carry out that replacement, three conditions are still needed: a candidate, an agreement within the CDU and the cooperation of the SPD. None of these three conditions is resolved. The 50% reflects a balance between Merz’s continuity until May 2029 and his departure before that date.
