Moldova as an Example of Failure in Electoral Interference
Moldova rarely surfaces on the international radar. Yet, its parliamentary elections have placed the country at the center of European geopolitics: there, Russia’s hybrid and information warfare is a reality, not a hypothesis. The victory of Maia Sandu’s pro‑European party, the country’s current president, offers a clear lesson: foreign interference is real, but manipulating elections is harder than it seems.
On paper, Moldova is a perfect setting for Russian interference. About 10% of Moldova’s population speaks Russian, with a much larger share if we count those who speak Russian fluently, even though their mother tongue is Romanian. The consumption of Russian cultural production, television, and information remains significant, even if it is waning. The country has an economy that moves with difficulty and a perception of widespread corruption. A portion of the country — Transnistria — is de facto independent thanks to Russia’s backing, which includes at least 1,500 soldiers on the territory.
Moldova as an Example of Failure in Electoral Interference
For the parliamentary elections held a couple of weeks ago and the presidential elections last year — which included a referendum on EU accession — the Kremlin has drawn on the full arsenal of its interference manual. This has included, among other methods, online campaigns to influence information, particularly on Telegram, Facebook, and TikTok; paying activists to amplify narratives; novel, yet questionable, uses of artificial intelligence or cryptocurrencies to buy votes and fund campaigns illegally. The Moldovan government has accused Russia of investing hundreds of millions of dollars to sway the vote.
What was the outcome? A resounding victory for the pro‑European bloc. Does this mean we can dismiss foreign interference in our elections? Absolutely not, but we must understand how to combat the phenomenon more effectively.
“Achieving political influence and the power to change the electorate’s voting intention is extremely difficult, even under optimal conditions.” We know little about how influence operations led by foreign powers affect voting. In general, there is the perception that they reinforce those who are already convinced and rely on distrust and polarization. We also know that the more sustained the efforts, the more influence they exert. All of this, together with the lack of access to data by major digital platforms and the clandestine nature of these operations, makes our understanding of the phenomenon elusive.
What we have been able to observe is how Russia weaves a complex network of influence in the countries it seeks to influence. This network is embedded in domestic reality, uses national actors, exploits the weaknesses of democratic systems, and takes advantage of the way platform algorithms work to amplify its message. In most cases, foreign interference seeks to inflame the flames created by internal dynamics in the countries. The aim is not typically a specific political change, but to sow confusion, mistrust, and polarization.
However, it is a mistake to operate under the premise that attempts at interference by countries like Russia are always successful. As has been shown, flooding the information environment with manipulative narratives does not automatically translate into influence. Often Moscow’s success is not to sway voters, but to create a sense of vulnerability: projecting the idea can swing elections at will. This generates a certain panic, amplifies the perceived capacity of Russia to influence, dilutes the responsibilities of domestic actors, and dulls the ability of democracies to respond.
How to Strengthen the Country Against Foreign Influences
A key factor in addressing the problem is disassembling the infrastructure that makes interference possible. This infrastructure consists of farms of fake accounts on digital platforms, artificial media created to lend credibility to certain narratives, companies that offer disinformation as a service, or illicit funding mechanisms for domestic actors. All of it rests on well‑documented problems of the digital ecosystem: algorithms that prioritize polarization, monetization of disinformation, and a lack of true transparency. Moldova’s experience also teaches us that tackling this entire web requires coordinated action among government entities, civil society, and society at large. In Spain, responsibilities lie with the National Security Department, which has the Unit for Risk Analysis Associated with the Digital Space — recently established — aligning Spain with the global trend. This unit still has to define its operational scope, the limits of its actions, the internal capabilities it will possess, which it will borrow from other state agencies, and what accountability mechanisms it will propose.
Its launch, however, reveals a clear trend: democracies are beginning to understand that the fight against foreign interference is won not only on the information front, but also by dismantling the structures that sustain it and, at the same time, strengthening the integrity of our institutions and electoral processes.
The opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the institutional position of IDEA International, its Council of Member States, or its Advisory Council.
