NATO Leaders Must Prepare for a World Without the United States

Since Moscow decided to invade Ukraine in 2022, the debate around European security and defence has accelerated. Yet as the challenges have shifted, so too has the sense that a trend of transformation—one that had been building for decades—might be underway. In the latest edition of CIDOB’s international conference War and Peace in the 21st Century, Carme Colomina, a senior researcher and editor at CIDOB, sits down with Daniel Fiott, head of the Defence and Statecraft programme at the Brussels School of Governance, and Max Bergmann, head of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia programme at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In their conversation, they analyse and probe this potential new era.

Both participants reach a common diagnosis: Europe is growing more distant from the United States and facing multiple fronts. Bergmann explains it this way: “For the first time in NATO’s history, the United States and Europe are concentrating on different threats”. Fiott adds that Europe confronts a challenge in its own decision-making, noting that “on every major political issue, it has been extremely difficult for Europeans to stay on the same path”.

Throughout the exchange, Colomina guides the experts through the contradictions accumulated in earlier periods: Washington urged Europe to spend more, yet slowed efforts to build a genuinely European defence; European governments are increasing their budgets, but “more money does not mean more Europe”. Ultimately, this is a dialogue about defence, but also about power, dependence, and the urgency of constructing a European autonomy that must advance swiftly, yet with proper organisation.
 

We are meeting at a pivotal moment: so much has happened since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. European defence is undergoing a genuine transformation. The very concept of security has shifted, and at the same time new layers of vulnerability keep surfacing: the transatlantic rift, Greenland, Iran. The sense of vulnerability does not fade; it grows. How do you assess what has happened in these past few years? How solid is this shift, and where do you see its weaknesses?

Max Bergmann (M. B.): To begin with, it is both structural and temporary. Structural in the sense that we are living through a different moment, a different epoch. For the first time in NATO’s history, the United States and Europe are focused on different threats. The United States should prioritise Russia, yet Washington’s main concern—across administrations—has been China. In Europe, by contrast, the principal threat remains Russia.

There is also a rising realisation in Washington that Europe must assume responsibility for its own security, and that trajectory is likely to endure. In some respects, the Biden era was an anomaly, a return to the past. What we are experiencing now suggests that any future administration will expect Europe to take charge of its own security.

“Europeans need to realise that they are on their own. The United States is not going to be there for them under this administration”

Then you add the disruption caused by Donald Trump—Greenland, Iran, his assaults on Europe as a cultural bloc, his assaults on the European Union—and we are in a markedly different place. Europeans must recognise that they are on their own. The United States will not stand by for them under this administration. And if it does, what price will be paid? Because that is the logic of this administration.

Daniel Fiott (D. F.): I don’t fundamentally disagree with Max. We are facing unprecedented crises. In some respects, the pandemic helped broaden this discussion into areas of European security we might not have contemplated before, such as supply chains and critical infrastructure. These topics have become central to everyday debates within the European Union and NATO.

There is clearly a structural shift underway in the transatlantic relationship. What worries me is that Europeans may still treat President Trump as a minor blip in the system. They should also consider the possibility that U.S. politics could deteriorate further. There is ample evidence that President Trump is, in many ways, an opportunist. He embraces chaos because he sees opportunities in it. He also relishes crises because they lay bare Europe’s vulnerabilities clearly.

But looking ahead, if one of his so‑called designated successors comes to power as the next president, he may be more ideological than Trump himself. This represents a particular concern for Europe, because portions of Washington’s political elite already demonstrate a visceral, hard‑to‑explain hostility towards Europe. It is hard to pinpoint the source, but it exists.

Thus, as Max suggested, whatever the future holds, Europeans must plan for their own defence. The mindset must be: we really are on our own. I understand why NATO policymakers do not want to be judged as those who destroyed NATO, but calmly and discreetly they should be preparing for a world in which the United States will not be present. That implies investing in defence and security in ways they have not done before.

When examining this shift, we often begin with the war in Ukraine. Yet you had already highlighted deeper, long‑term changes in the U.S. outlook. Barack Obama spoke of free riders and leading from behind. The signs were there. Perhaps Europeans failed to read them, which left them vulnerable. How can Europe address this now, especially given the enduring internal divisions within the EU over how to relate to the United States? Russia poses one challenge, China another, but now the United States itself has become a third layer of challenge—and also a source of division among member states.

M. B.: When I reflect on European defence and security, the United States bears a large portion of the responsibility. Over the past thirty years, we kept telling Europeans to get their act together and increase defence spending. But every time there was a move for the European Union to take a more active role in defence, we pushed back and said: not that, don’t go there.

That stance persisted under Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Biden—it has been continuous. Why? Because the United States enjoyed more influence in Europe than in any other region of the world. It benefited from the status quo. Why risk upsetting NATO? Why upset the established order? If the EU begins to deepen its defence, Europeans might not rely on the United States as much.

So the United States faced its own confusion. On one side, those centered on NATO sought to preserve the status quo, with America in the lead. On the other, those who paid little attention to Europe and NATO kept asking why Europe wasn’t stronger. That confusion is now baked into today’s structure, where defence in the EU is still viewed as competing with NATO. Why? Because twenty‑eight years ago the United States dismissed the idea of duplication. It lacked a clear strategy. It wanted the status quo, but it was unsettled by it.

D. F.: I don’t dispute that. Especially after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, there was a strong push among European leaders to shoulder more responsibility. The problem was that whenever Europe tried to move in that direction, Washington would call out, saying: easy, easy—perhaps we’re happier with you making statements on defence rather than actually taking steps.

That is changing now. The mindset has indeed shifted. And if, in the future, someone in the White House harbours a more constructive view of Europe, and Europe becomes more autonomous in defence—with the capabilities and the political strength to deploy power globally—the United States may come to view that as a positive development.

But Europe has long been caught in that immediate post‑Cold War dynamic where Europeans were seen as the weaker party, the free riders. Whenever they attempted action, they were told to stop. That cycle has now been broken.
 

There is also a widely held narrative that Europeans do not spend enough, yet in recent years they have been increasing their spending. So is the real issue the amount spent, or the way it is spent? And what does that look like in practice? Does higher spending translate into a stronger Europe, or simply a more heavily armed Europe that isn’t necessarily more capable?

D. F.: That is a crucial point, because there are several layers to unpack. First, more money does not automatically translate into more Europe. In fact, when governments have more funds, there is a tendency to invest domestically.

“There has to be a European level to this investment, especially in those defence capabilities that no single member state can deliver”

Now, we must be careful with that argument, since many European governments are starting from a near‑blank slate when it comes to defence. So insisting that all investments be purely national is not realistic. Some national investment is inevitable—to energise the industrial base and to gain public support. In today’s climate—rising food prices, budget cuts in health and education, the energy crisis—it is even harder for governments to justify defence. They must demonstrate to citizens that this money also flows back into their own economies.

However, that cannot become the defining feature of investment. There has to be a European dimension to these investments, particularly in those defence capabilities that no single member state can deliver alone. Otherwise, it’s just money wasted—sprinkled around without producing real military capabilities.

The second issue is political. Imagine a future where Europeans possess the capabilities, the industrial base, the innovation, and the trained, well‑equipped militaries. Even then, one major political problem would endure: our disunity as Europeans. On every major political issue, it has been extraordinarily difficult for Europeans to stay on the same track. Just look at the Iran crisis today. Where is Europe’s moral authority? It seems to reside with either the Pope or Pedro Sánchez, and not much else. That is the kind of disunity I’m talking about, and it is deeply problematic.

M. B.: A couple of quick reflections, partly to push back against Daniel. I don’t see European disunity in the way Europe sees the world, or in how Europe wants to act, or in the broad contours of European foreign policy. Europe is fairly united there.

The problem is structural. In foreign policy, there should be room for division. There is never total unity in the United States about its approach to the world. There are two parties, disagreements, and competing viewpoints. The problem in Europe is that to have a coherent foreign policy, everyone has to agree. That means Europe only agrees on the easy things—those that matter little.

So there is a substantial structural challenge in how Europe represents itself internationally. It’s not that there are no shared interests or views; it’s that there is no single voice, no single interlocutor, and no effective foreign‑policy mechanism capable of expressing them clearly.

The second obstacle is the notion of sovereignty—national sovereignty. Europeans have not been sovereign on defence since 1945—perhaps Spain a bit differently, but certainly Western Europe. Instead of collaborating and integrating defence efforts as the European project originally envisioned through a European Defence Community, Europeans failed. The United States had strongly supported that idea because it did not want to remain in Europe indefinitely. That was never the plan after World War II.

The famous NATO slogan—keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down—is a British expression. The Americans did not want to stay, and the plan was for them to leave by building a common European military. Eisenhower backed this idea when he was NATO Supreme Allied Commander and later as president. But when it collapsed after the French vote against it, the United States faced a tough choice: Europeans could not defend themselves, so what did we do? And so the matter remained unresolved.

“Europe outsourced its defence to a foreign power, and that foreign power either does not want to do it anymore or wants a great deal in return”

D. F.: And it could be even worse if we include Greenland in the equation. Then it’s not just about breaking dependency; it’s a hostile act of territorial take‑over.

In the end, the European Union has always characterised itself as a peace project, yet it was an armed peace project, and the arms came from the United States. That part was never fully explained. At the same time, I sometimes feel Europe should also tell Washington: be careful what you wish for. If Europeans actually heeded all that Washington now demands—spending 5% on defence, taking the lead, and becoming fully independent in security—NATO might cease to be as useful or attractive to the United States as it is today.

M. B.: I disagree. If you go back to John F. Kennedy’s 1962 Philadelphia speech about transatlantic interdependence, the idea was that the United States of America and the United States of Europe would work together. What the United States should seek is a true partner.

Yes, those who work on NATO appreciate the influence the United States wields through it. But what it should want is a Europe that can stand up for the same values—stability, rule of law, democracy, freedom—and help spread those values worldwide. That should be the objective.
 

And perhaps that is what the European Union now feels it can defend more firmly than the United States itself.

M. B.: That is true. But then it becomes a matter of Europe actually standing up and promoting those values in the world, rather than simply bowing to Washington.

Let me close with this, Daniel. If everyone is calling for a stronger European pillar within NATO, who should take the lead of that pillar?

D. F.: That is a highly challenging question. I hear a lot about the Europeanisation of NATO, but I still struggle to see what that would mean in practical terms. If we faced a scenario where the United States decided tomorrow that it no longer wished to be in NATO, then is it still the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Or would it become a European Treaty Organisation? Plus Canada, Turkey, and the United Kingdom would present their own challenges, of course.

“The worst‑case scenario is that Europe Europeanises NATO in such a way that it simply imports into NATO all the elements it dislikes about the EU today”

So I understand why governments might be tempted to pursue Europeanising NATO. In their minds, NATO already has the command structures, and so on. But they overlook the deterrent power the United States has historically brought. The United States possesses a decisional capacity that Europeans cannot easily replicate. I often pose this question to my students: who should be the European SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]? And you immediately see the kinds of conflicts that would emerge simply from choosing the person.

In a European defence framework, you need a robust decision‑making architecture. Without it, adversaries will not take you seriously. The worst‑case scenario is that Europe Europeanises NATO in a way that simply imports into NATO all the features it dislikes about the EU today. That would be a grave mistake.

So Europe must think very carefully, not only about the capabilities and forces it requires—and these are essential—but also about the decision‑making processes. And for that, governments must stop behaving as they have for many years, which is to rely on the United States or to avoid taking decisions themselves.

Thank you very much.