Yet another federal court opinion dismissing constitutional climate change claims.
Yesterday, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Lighthiser v. Trump, the latest in a string of lawsuits brought by young plaintiffs who contend that the federal government’s inaction on climate change—and, in particular, the Trump Administration’s backing of fossil fuels—violates the U.S. Constitution.
The panel disposed of the plaintiffs’ arguments in a concise, unpublished opinion. Despite a strong lineup of amici supporting their position, the plaintiffs failed to persuade any of the three judges—Owens, Van Dyke, and Sung—that they had proper standing or that the merits warranted discussion.
A key issue in this appeal was whether the plaintiffs could sufficiently distinguish their case from the Juliana case, which the Ninth Circuit had previously dismissed on standing grounds. Unsurprisingly, the court found the attempt to distinguish the two cases unconvincing.
From the opinion:
1. Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that their asserted injuries are “caused by the challenged” Executive Orders. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2020).1 According to the complaint, Plaintiffs will be harmed by numerous agency actions which, Plaintiffs allege, will “implement” the Executive Orders over several years. But Plaintiffs can only speculate that the Executive Orders are the cause of the many agency actions they allege will exacerbate climate change. See G.B. ex rel. G.P. v. EPA, 172 F.4th 1042, 1060 (9th Cir. 2026) (“[A]gencies consider a great number of … factors in determining when, what, and how to regulate or take agency action.” (citation modified)); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 412–14 (2013) (rejecting a traceability theory premised on speculation that government surveillance would occur, if at all, under challenged authority rather than another). Furthermore, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin any “implementing” agency action, including those not identified in the complaint. But we “cannot presume to predict how governing officials might exercise their discretion.” G.B., 172 F.4th at 1059 (citation modified). Whether agencies will rely on the Executive Orders when taking future action “is mere conjecture.” Id. at 1061 (citation modified). For these reasons, the link between the Executive Orders and Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries is too speculative to support Article III standing. See FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 383 (2024); G.B., 172 F.4th at 1058–62.
2. Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief is also neither “substantially likely to redress their injuries” nor “within the district court’s power to award.” Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1170 (citation omitted).
Regarding the redressability prong, Plaintiffs’ standing theory mirrors their traceability problems. See All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 380–81 (noting that “causation and redressability … are often flip sides of the same coin” (citation modified)). They have not plausibly alleged that stopping federal agencies from implementing the Executive Orders would substantially likely prevent actions that emit greenhouse gases under other lawful authorities.
Second, as in Juliana, Article III does not authorize federal courts to grant or enforce the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171. The Executive Orders articulate broad national security, energy, and economic policy, then instruct executive branch agencies to pursue these aims in line with applicable law. The injunction Plaintiffs request, by its terms, would prevent the President from concluding, among other things, that it is “in the national interest to unleash America’s affordable and reliable energy and natural resources,” Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8353; that current energy infrastructure is “far too inadequate to meet our Nation’s needs,” Exec. Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8433; and that “coal is essential to our national and economic security,” Exec. Order No. 14261, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15517. The injunction would likewise bar agencies from carrying out the President’s policies—”consistent with applicable law”—by reexamining prior actions, “encourag[ing] energy exploration and production on Federal lands and waters,” and “protect[ing] the United States’s economic and national security … by ensuring that an abundant supply of reliable energy is readily accessible in every State and territory of the Nation.” Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8353–54.
Issuing such an injunction would effectively place a single federal district court in charge of executive branch energy policy—”an extraordinary and unprecedented role” for a member of the “unelected and politically unaccountable branch.” Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1173 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1171–72 (noting that shaping environmental policy involves “a host of complex policy decisions entrusted … to the wisdom and discretion of the executive and legislative branches” (citation modified)).
Plaintiffs contend that, unlike the Juliana plaintiffs—which sought a court-supervised “remedial plan” requiring the federal government to “draw down harmful emissions”—they merely seek “traditional prohibitory injunctive relief.” But the court was not persuaded. Similar to the relief requested in Juliana, the injunction the Plaintiffs seek would demand extensive judicial oversight of executive actions related to energy policy. Indeed, Plaintiffs explicitly seek to undo everything from staffing reductions to revocation of research grants, to anticipated rule changes, to the very language the current administration has used on government websites. Assigning such policy-driven choices to a single district court would invert the ordinary balance of duties among legislatures, executives, and courts.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Moreover, as the district court observed, enforcing such an injunction would require a court to determine whether “an untold number” of executive actions actually “implement” the challenged Executive Orders. That task would entail a broad array of policymaking questions that “necessarily would entail a broad range of policymaking.” Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1172. For instance, would the injunction bar agencies from pursuing policies that promote coal, oil, natural gas and hydropower; boost domestic energy production; or accelerate permitting and leasing timelines, to name a few? For every energy-policy action, would the court scrutinize officials’ motives for any hidden reliance on the enjoined Executive Orders? And what if an agency relied on other authorities besides the Executive Orders? The district court rightfully noted that disputes over such questions would inevitably involve lengthy proceedings with the parties and hearings lasting potentially a lifetime. These unmanageable consequences, for which there are no judicially manageable standards, show that the Plaintiffs’ requested injunction exceeds Article III power. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1173–75. After all, an injunction is only as effective as the court’s ability to enforce it.” Id. at 1173.
Additionally, by challenging hundreds of current and anticipated agency actions in a single suit, the Plaintiffs attempt to sidestep the jurisdictional and procedural rules Congress has established for challenges to agency actions. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706; 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). A sweeping injunction against hundreds of agency actions in one case is without precedent. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 892–94 (1990) (explaining that rather than pursuing a case-by-case review of flaws in an entire program, the courts normally operate on a traditional, case-by-case basis (citation modified)); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (“Where Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right, we have, in suits against federal officers, refused to supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary.”).
That said, this case may not be over. The plaintiffs could pursue a rehearing en banc or a writ of certiorari, as they have done in previous climate suits. I also anticipate they will file additional suits asserting similar challenges to specific actions of the Trump Administration. While such filings might clear the standing hurdle, they are unlikely to generate greater success. The underlying constitutional claims appear to be an overreach, and current doctrine strongly disfavors them.
