From Doe v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc., a decision issued recently by Judge Robert Golger of the Bridgeport, Connecticut Superior Court:
The plaintiff, Jane Doe, filed this case seeking a Bill of Discovery against Sacred Heart University (Sacred Heart), the national Phi Sigma Sigma Fraternity, Inc., and The IOTA NU Chapter of the Phi Sigma Sigma Fraternity. The complaint contends that during the Fall of 2025 she was involved in an incident with an underclassman during pledge week in which she was recorded on video while encouraging a fraternity pledge to consume alcohol (the hazing incident). The episode is described in paragraphs 11–15 of her complaint. The video subsequently circulated across the campus.
The plaintiff contends that she became the target of harassment and cyberbullying after the hazing incident was published, and that the defendants failed to carry out a meaningful investigation into her complaints. She further contends that she faced improper disciplinary proceedings and ultimately felt forced to withdraw from Sacred Heart. She seeks records related to the defendants’ investigation into the hazing incident and the retaliation (anonymous online harassment) that led to her “constructive expulsion” from the university.
The plaintiff also asserts that the retaliation triggered severe anxiety and depression. She seeks to pursue the Bill of Discovery by proceeding under a pseudonym.
The plaintiff’s request to litigate under a pseudonym was initially granted on an ex parte basis. The defendants object to the continued use of a pseudonym. The plaintiff maintains that ongoing pseudonym status is necessary. She has submitted affidavits supporting her claims that detail the harassment and threats she has faced and the impact those acts have had on her physical and emotional health.
The standard for granting pseudonym status is set forth in Practice Book § 11–20A(h)(1), which states, in pertinent part: “Pseudonyms may be used in place of the name of a party or parties only with the prior approval of the judicial authority and only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public’s interest in knowing the name of the party or parties.”
“The principle of openness in judicial proceedings includes consideration of whether one may proceed anonymously, because the question of who uses the judicial system is typically as much a part of that principle as why it is used.” For that reason, our Supreme Court has stated that “the privilege of using fictitious names in actions should be granted only in the rare case where the nature of the issue litigated and the interests of the parties demand it and no harm can be done to the public interest.”
“The presumption of openness of court proceedings … is a fundamental principle of our judicial system.” This openness policy should not be curtailed without careful justification.
“The ultimate test for permitting a [party] to proceed anonymously is whether the [party] possesses a substantial privacy right that outweighs the customary and constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.” “A [party’s] wish to avoid economic and social harm as well as embarrassment and humiliation in his professional and social circles is typically insufficient to permit anonymity.” “The most compelling circumstances [for granting anonymity] involve extremely sensitive matters, such as social stigmatization, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury at issue would be caused by disclosing the [party’s] identity…. There must be a strong public interest in concealing the party’s identity….”
The court has reviewed the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff regarding her treatment and recognizes the scope of her claimed harm and fears. However, the court must determine whether it is appropriate to shield the identity of someone who has harmed another. A survey of relevant precedents on pseudonym applications reveals no cases where an initial wrongdoer was permitted to proceed under a pseudonym on the basis of retaliation-related harm stemming from their wrongdoing.
After weighing the competing interests, the court has found that the plaintiff’s right to privacy does not outweigh the public interest in preserving the openness of these judicial proceedings. Consequently, the defendants’ objection to the continued use of a pseudonym is sustained.
James M. Sconzo and Marc G. Bernatchez (Carlton Fields, P.C.) represent the University.
