From Schultz v. Stevenson, decided today by California Court of Appeal Judges Peter Krause, Shama Hakim Mesiwala, and Stacy Boulware Eurie:
In 2004, the parties bought a home in Grass Valley, California, taking title as “husband and wife as joint tenants.” In 2020, Schultz obtained a Dubai divorce decree from Stevenson, which addressed marital status and child custody but contained no determinations concerning property division or spousal support.
Many years afterward, Schultz filed a lawsuit seeking to partition the Grass Valley property by ordering a sale and dividing the proceeds. Stevenson opposed the partition, contending that the Dubai divorce decree is not enforceable in California and that the property should be treated as community property not subject to partition under California law. The trial court ultimately ruled for Schultz, holding that the parties are divorced and that the Grass Valley property is not community property.
Stevenson argued that the trial court exceeded its discretion by extending comity to the Dubai decree because the decree rests on Islamic (Sharia) law that conflicts with California’s public policy and constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. She asserted that the Dubai divorce does not merit comity since it was based on a talaq proclamation of divorce, which she argued contravenes California’s public policy favoring gender equality and protections against gender-based discrimination. In most cases, a talaq divorce is initiated by the husband. Stevenson thus maintained that she and Schultz remain legally married, and that the Nevada County property constitutes community property that cannot be partitioned.
We hold that Stevenson has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree.
Under the doctrine of comity, courts in this country typically give effect to foreign judgments when the foreign court had proper jurisdiction and their enforcement would not prejudice the rights of American citizens or run afoul of domestic public policy. Even if portions of Sharia law, such as a talaq declaration, clash with our policy of gender equality and constitutional protections against gender-based discrimination, the mere fact that some foreign laws diverge from ours does not automatically bar comity.
The central tenet of judicial comity is that a court should not disturb another court’s resolution of a dispute without compelling reasons. The threshold for refusing a foreign judgment on public policy grounds is high and rarely met. The standard is not merely that the law conflicts with our policy, but that it is so offensive to our public policy as to jeopardize recognized moral standards and the interests of our citizens. Even where a foreign law offends public policy, it can sometimes be applied in a limited context where potential harm is minimal. (See In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate (Cal. App. 1948), discussed in the context of intestate succession, where foreign law permitting polygamy was applied under comity principles.)
Here, we are not persuaded that extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree would unlawfully prejudice Stevenson’s rights or violate California’s public policy on gender equality. It is important to note that the Dubai judgment addressed only two issues—marital status and child custody—and the trial court limited its comity to the aspect related to marital status. Stevenson argues that custody and support issues have become moot since the children reached adulthood. Because Stevenson clearly did not wish to remain married to Schultz, we cannot conclude that recognizing the Dubai judgment as terminating the marriage was an abuse of discretion.
The core of Stevenson’s claim appears to be that recognizing the foreign divorce would bar her from receiving spousal support and from an equitable division of the marital estate. We reject that premise. As noted, the Dubai judgment did not address spousal support or the distribution of California community property.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that the trial court has ordered the property to be partitioned and sold but has not yet determined how the proceeds will be allocated, reserving jurisdiction “to determine the manner in which the sale proceeds are to be disbursed, and to order any equitable adjustments that the court considers just and appropriate.” Consequently, it is premature for us to consider whether the proposed distribution would amount to an abuse of discretion.
Robin D. Shofner (Scale LLP) represents Schultz.
