Robert Kaplan: Migration Is the Big Issue of Our Time

September 13, 2026

Rober t Kaplan has stood for decades as one of the globe’s most influential voices in geopolitics. The author of twenty-four books on foreign policy and travel —including The Revenge of Geography— he contends that the Ceuta crisis is a matter of a history-and-geography question, with migration sitting at its very core. Concerning Spain’s stance, he notes that the government wants to come across as compassionate, while at the same time it does not want refugees in the country.

Kaplan, one of the confirmed speakers at Foro La Toja 2026, is critical of the European Union, which he characterizes as an elitist institution that struggles to connect with what ordinary people worry about. Regarding the National Rally in France and Germany’s AfD, he argues they are, above all, anti-migration parties. “If there were no migration, no refugees”, he says, “the AfD would lose influence very, very quickly”.

Turning to the United States, the UT Austin professor contends that the war in Iran exposes a “complete lack of policy discipline” on the Trump administration’s part. He describes the president as “very simplistic, crude and bombastic”, but cautions: “As bad as the Trump administration is, China is not Europe’s ally”. This November, Kaplan will publish China Whisperers: The Voices That Have Shaped America’s Views of Its Chief Geopolitical Rival.
 

Professor Kaplan speaks with Agenda Pública reporter Jorge de Diego Hurtado. Photo: Agenda Pública.

As you might have guessed, my first question concerns Morocco and Spain, and what has occurred in Ceuta. From a realist foreign-policy perspective, how should Spain engage with a neighbor it needs but that can also press its limits?

Ultimately, this boils down to history and geography. Spain’s options are limited to management of the situation. We live in a world where hundreds of millions of impoverished people seek to move to places with jobs and at least some opportunities.

Historically, refugees always manage to find a path. You can block them here or there, but migration is an inevitability. Migration is the story of history; it is the story of humanity. Governments can take steps, but ultimately the challenge is one of managing the problem.

And how should Spain manage it?

The government wishes to be humane, but it is pressed by political forces that prevent it from acting humanely. That is the real dilemma facing the Spanish government. It wants to empathize with migrants and refugees, but it does not want refugees in the country.

Thus it is caught in a historic bind. Once again, the solution lies in managing the problem. There will be no easy fix because Ceuta sits there, and Morocco sits there; it is right on Spain’s border.

In this mix of actors, what role should the European Union play?

The European Union is an elitist institution. It was founded by elites, with an elitist vision of a union: a common currency, common politics and shared viewpoints.

The problem is that it is an elite vision. It does not resonate with what ordinary people worry about. For me, migration is the real giant issue in Europe.

“The government wants to be humane, but it is under political pressure that prevents it from being humane”

The Brussels elites see people from all over the world who are sophisticated, multilingual, and fully capable, yet these are not the migrants that people in the countryside and beyond Brussels recognize in their daily lives. What is National Rally in France? It is an anti-migration party. What is Germany’s AfD, really? Is it a Nazi party? Not really. It is an anti-migration party. If there were no migration, no refugees, the AfD would lose influence very quickly.

So this is the big issue of our times. Migration affects ordinary people and what they see in their lives, but it does not affect the elites in the same way. The elites are therefore not as emotionally engaged in managing it.

If Russia continues to press on NATO’s eastern flank, what does geography tell us? How should European leaders respond to Russia?

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and in other parts of Eastern Europe also reduces to geography. Who feels most threatened by Russia aside from Ukraine itself? The countries of Eastern Europe that border Russia or lie nearby: Poland, the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, etc.

When you argue with them about increasing defense budgets or deploying more tanks, they understand it. They grasp the point, and they are acting on it.

When you present the same argument to Spain and Portugal, it rings weaker because they are situated at the far western edge of Europe. Spain is not threatened by Russian tanks; it is threatened by refugees.

Therefore, Spain, even if it won’t admit it, does not want to raise its defense budget because it does not feel threatened. It worries about Ceuta. It is not worried about Ukraine. That is what truly moves Spanish politics. It is all driven by geography.

Turning to the United States. Under Trump, the nation is diminishing its role in safeguarding Europe. Which countries will be compelled to assume leadership in European security, geographically speaking? Should anyone step up?

Look, eighty years is a long chapter in history. For eighty years, the United States supported and eagerly led NATO. That is a long tenure. It outlived many Roman dynasties. When you examine history closely, nothing lasts forever.

Eighty years ago, Europe lay in ruins. It was bankrupt and vulnerable. The United States controlled roughly half of the world’s manufacturing capacity and was therefore in a position to lead and shield Europe. Eighty years later, the United States accounts for only about a quarter of that manufacturing capacity. Europe, by contrast, is wealthier. The world has changed.

“For 80 years, the US supported and enthusiastically led NATO. That is a long time. It is longer than many Roman dynasties”

In 2011, the U.S. secretary of defense, Robert Gates, who served under Barack Obama, toured Europe, warning Europeans that they needed to boost their defense budgets dramatically and immediately. Otherwise, there would come an American president who would not be sympathetic to Europe, and the American people would not be sympathetic either. He warned Europeans in no uncertain terms.

But the Europeans did nothing, because they felt the Americans had no choice but to defend Europe. So why should they ask their taxpayers to fund higher defense outlays? It turns out America did have a choice. It does have a choice. Nothing lasts forever.

That is the crisis we face now. Trump is Trump; we can criticize him all day. But this crisis could have been alleviated long ago if Europe had acted in previous decades.

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El profesor Robert Kaplan en una visita a España.

The professor Robert Kaplan on a visit to Spain. | Jorge Gil / Europa Press

Robert D. Kaplan conversando con Jordi Xuclà y nuestro consejero, Rodrigo Pinedo.

Robert D. Kaplan conversing with Jordi Xuclà and our advisor, Rodrigo Pinedo. | Agenda Pública

Let us stay with Trump for a moment. I suspect several facets of his foreign policy in Venezuela and his close ties with Morocco can be understood through geography. How does Trump grasp geography, including key resources?

Trump is a real-estate man. He knows maps. He understands maps.

He says, “Greenland, that should be ours.” That is the way he thinks. He is very simplistic, crude, and bombastic.

He has little understanding of America’s historical relationship with Europe because he does not read books. So he knows nothing about what happened in World War II or eighty years ago.

He looks at Venezuela and says, “That should be ours,” or something close to it, “We should wield substantial influence there.” He envisions a greatly expanded North America under U.S. control that would include Greenland, Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico.

He even wants to rename the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America. That is the scale of his thinking. If something is spatial and visual, he gets it. If it is historical, he has little interest in or understanding of it.

From that vantage point, how do you interpret what has happened, and what is happening, in Iran?

A complete lack of policy discipline. At some point, the Iranian regime will change, but probably not quickly enough to yield a Trump victory. We’re talking a few years down the road.

The regime is unpopular and Iran’s domestic economy is in dire straits. This cannot go on forever. Yet betting on a regime collapse is rarely wise. Regimes are resilient; they can cling to power longer than you might expect. Think of North Korea.

“Regimes are resilient; they can hang on to power for longer than you can imagine”

After the Cold War ended, people expected North Korea to topple next, and likewise Cuba. That was 1989, thirty-six years ago. Those regimes still persist.

Would it be wonderful if the Iranian regime weakened? Certainly. Do I think it is wise to bet on that now? Not really. Trump should not have embarked on a second war against Iran.

Turning to China. In November you will publish China Whisperers: The Voices That Have Helped Shape America’s Views of Its Chief Geopolitical Rival. What is the current outlook for China in the United States?

China represents, by a wide margin, the most consequential foreign-policy issue for the United States. Wars in the Middle East and in Ukraine have occurred, but they do not substantially affect the typical American’s wallet.

Markets have shown a remarkable capacity to price in and absorb the costs of the Gaza, Iran, and Ukraine conflicts. Yet that would not hold if a direct military clash between the United States and China were to erupt. Then you would witness stock-market collapses, chaos of all kinds, and the erosion of retirement savings.

Thus, China stands as by far the most critical foreign-policy challenge. The Trump administration’s approach has been erratic and poorly coordinated.

“China is by far the most important foreign-policy issue in the United States”

The president, spontaneously and without much contemplation, praises the North Korean dictator. He remains unsure about arms sales to Taiwan. This is the sort of impulsive policy that invites misjudgments and, inevitably, conflict.

And I know we aren’t exactly in the same position, but how do you view Europe’s relationship with China?

I believe that, notwithstanding the Trump administration’s flaws, China is not Europe’s ally. China is a totalitarian Leninist state that steals technology and poses serious risks. Europe finds itself in a difficult position: it wants to profit from China, yet cannot afford to be its ally at the same time.

So, no matter how frustrated Europe—and Canada in particular—become with President Trump, that should not push them toward an alliance with China.

What alternative would you propose, then, for Europe and Canada?

There isn’t a simple alternative. We inhabit a harsh world with no easy answers. One fundamental rule of foreign-policy realism is that there isn’t a single solution to every problem.

Europe did reasonably well when the United States had moderate, rational presidents and U.S.–Chinese relations were functional. They may not have been warm, but they were workable. That was a relatively navigable world for Europe.

That world does not exist today, at least not until the next president, and we will have to wait and see how it unfolds.

Thank you very much.

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Natalie Foster

I’m a political writer focused on making complex issues clear, accessible, and worth engaging with. From local dynamics to national debates, I aim to connect facts with context so readers can form their own informed views. I believe strong journalism should challenge, question, and open space for thoughtful discussion rather than amplify noise.