If knowledge could spread like a contagion, a few hours spent in Erik Jones’s office would be one of the simplest ways to catch it. The director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (EUI) welcomes Agenda Pública in Florence to explore the intricate context in which Europe finds itself today.
With a PhD in International Relations and a long-standing academic career, Professor Jones is not particularly anxious about Ukraine joining the EU (“it is going to happen”), yet he harbours questions about the European budget and the money that must be allocated to enlargement, a process that could involve up to twelve candidate countries. “How is that enlargement going to be reflected in the budget?” he asks.
In the interview, conducted during the EUI’s 50th anniversary celebrations, in which Agenda Pública served as a media partner, there was ample time to discuss at length the relationship between Europe and the United States. Jones has advanced an intriguing notion, post-Atlantic Europe, and on this point he insists that “it is not only that Europeans need to realise that the situation has changed. They have to realise it now and act now”.
After surveying some of his book covers and noting several honours —Ukrainian, Indonesian and Slovak among them—, the professor concedes that he does not own many works on Spanish politics, although at the end of the interview he emphasised his strong interest in Spain’s international projection.
A part of Jones’s library, with several honours and mementos from his academic career. Photo: Agenda Pública / Jorge de Diego
My first question concerns a very topical issue: the European Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework. There is a lot of debate surrounding this matter, and it has also been addressed here today at the EUI. I would like to know what your expectations are for this MFF, and to what extent the outcome of these negotiations will signal Europe’s future or shape the orientation of the European institutions.
There are three key points to understand about the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework.
The first is that, as with any MFF, the central question concerns how funds will be allocated across the different spending categories in which the European Union operates. If we assume that spending remains at the same level as a share of gross national income, there will simply be moves from one box to another.
And we know these shifts will occur because there is a substantial rise in the demands for defence spending, industrial policy and infrastructure. The EU is also still striving to finance the digital and green transitions. All of this implies a real reshuffling of priorities.
“Everything we have talked about is becoming increasingly expensive: security, digital, green, infrastructure and industrial policy are all much more important now”
That reshuffling is always challenging, because there are constituencies —farmers, for example— who currently receive funding through European budgets as they are designed today, and who would lose money if those budgets are adjusted in the future. So far, this is all fairly normal, except that everything we have discussed is becoming increasingly expensive: security, digital, green, infrastructure and industrial policy are all much more important now.
But two additional issues complicate matters even further.
One is that the EU needs additional own resources to repay the loans from Next Generation EU. The Commission has included that in its initial proposal, but it would raise the ratio to gross national income by about a quarter of a percentage point, simply to service and amortise the Next Generation EU debt.
Member states respond: wait a moment, we already face a tightening budget, and now you want more money. The answer is: no, we are not asking for more in the sense of increased overall spending; we need to repay the money already borrowed. But politically, that is not an easy message to sell.
The third issue is that twelve countries aspire to join the European Union. How will we pay for that? How will they be included in this budget? Where will the budget be adjusted or expanded to accommodate the needs of Ukraine and Moldova, or the Western Balkan countries?
Should Turkey be given up on? Because whatever we do with the budget will send a clear signal to politicians in that country. If there is no financial provision for enlargement, then everyone in Turkey will understand that Turkey is no longer truly in the running. Of course, they already know that, but the symbolic weight is substantial.
“If no money is allocated to enlargement in this MFF, the credibility of the enlargement process in the eyes of the candidate countries will vanish overnight”
If no funding for enlargement is included in this MFF, the credibility of the enlargement process in the eyes of the candidate countries will vanish overnight. They will see that there is no money to accommodate enlargement, and they will conclude that it is not really being planned.
Speaking of enlargement, I wanted to ask you specifically about Ukraine, because it is a particularly sensitive issue right now. Do you think it could happen soon? How would it integrate with NATO?
The European Union must support Ukraine because it cannot allow Ukraine to fall under Russia. And the EU must ensure Ukraine’s reconstruction. It also must guarantee that Russia does not reemerge after Ukraine has been rebuilt and destroy everything again.
There is only one way to do all of this: to formalise the relationship between Europe, the European Union and Ukraine in some manner. We can call that accession or enlargement, but we do not have to. We can label it whatever we wish. The problem is that it is just as costly.
People tend to think of enlargement as the moment a country becomes a member state, but that is not the right way to conceive of it. Becoming a member state marks the end of the process.
Think about people and firms. Millions of Ukrainians live in the European Union. Ukrainians rely on the European Union and access to the EU for their daily survival. Ukrainian firms are redirecting all of their activity toward the European Union. At the same time, EU firms are integrating themselves into value chains in Ukraine, even amid this war.
So in a peculiar way, even if we do not regard Ukraine as an official member state, Ukraine is integrating with Europe right now faster than any country of its size has ever done in the past. Even faster than the United Kingdom integrated with Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.
“As the clusters are unlocked, Ukraine will move quickly through them. There will be issues, no doubt. There will be turbulence. But at some point, Ukraine will join”
So when you look at that timetable, how long have we been working on Ukraine’s accession process? We have already been at it for a couple of years. It is going to happen. Negotiations will open this year. The negotiating clusters will begin to be unlocked in June, assuming the Hungarian government fulfils its duties. And as the clusters are unlocked, Ukraine will move quickly through them. There will be issues, no doubt. There will be turbulence. But at some point, Ukraine will join.
The view from the balcony where the conversation took place, in Fiesole. Photo: Agenda Pública / Jorge de Diego
It is interesting, because I expected you to discuss the United States when I asked about Ukraine, and you did not. So let us talk about what you define as “post-Atlantic Europe.” The picture seems fairly clear, but I sense that some EU states act as if, once Trump is out of the picture, everything will revert to how it used to be.
The key thing to keep in mind is that Europeans have spent their entire lives viewing the United States not only as a reliable partner, but as an admirable one. And that is hard to give up. It is hard to relinquish in the United States as well.
I was recently in Washington, speaking with people, especially on the Democratic side of the aisle, and they said: when we win the midterms, transatlantic relations will reset to the way they were. And I replied: that is not going to happen. They also said: if we win the presidency in 2028, it will simply reset to the pre-Trump era. But it did not revert to the Biden era, and Biden remains strongly pro-Atlantic.
“The United States has always said that Europe needs to spend more on its security. But it has also always said that Europeans should not invest in duplicating assets that the United States brings to the table”
Here lies the essential point. Throughout the history of the transatlantic partnership, the United States has consistently urged Europe to increase its defense expenditure. Yet it has also consistently cautioned Europeans against duplicating assets that Washington already supplies: large, costly assets like satellite intelligence, command and control capabilities, strategic airlift, or carrier groups.
The United States was basically saying: acquire small, mobile armored units you can move around, and if we need to project force, we will provide the strategic lift to carry your mobile units elsewhere, for example to Afghanistan.
That stance is no longer credible. Europeans are asking how long it will take to develop their own strategic lift. The answer is: a long time. And if it will take a long time, and you fear that the United States might —not will, but might— deny Europeans access to American strategic lift, then you have no choice but to start now.
To anyone who claims that Trump was merely an anomaly, I would say this: Trump was an aberration. Trump II represented the voice of the American people, indicating that, despite what happened on January 6, despite what occurred during the first Trump Administration, and despite everything we know about Trump’s relationships, they still want him to be president. When the American people express what they truly want, you should believe them.
“It is not only that Europeans need to realise that the situation has changed. They have to realise it now and act on it now”
In that context, it is not enough for Europeans to realise that the situation has changed; they must realise it now and act on it now. And when you tell this to Europeans who deeply love the United States and want the United States to always be present, accepting it is very difficult.
Yet the argument is penetrating because they cannot afford to wait. And this is not solely about strategic lift. It also concerns large data servers and data farms. We need somewhere to house our own data. It also concerns the infrastructure for financial telecommunications and post-trade operations. We require the capacity to manage our own finances without passing through the dollar or relying on institutions that the United States could access or restrict.
I think Europeans are reaching that conclusion, albeit reluctantly and with considerable unease. They are not moving at the same pace, but they are getting there.
That does not mean the transatlantic relationship will end. There will always be significant American investment in Europe and substantial European investment in the United States. There will always be people who have had meaningful experiences on both sides of the Atlantic and wish to repeat them.
But it does mean that the relationship will be markedly different. And if Europeans disagree about what that “very different” looks like, I am not surprised. Difference is simply different. Everyone must experience it in their own way before they truly understand and accept it.
If you had to pick just one reform for the European Union to steer through the next decade, given you have outlined what Europe needs to face this future without the United States—defense, strategic autonomy and other issues—what would be the single most important reform?
If I could only do one thing, as someone who studies politics, I would rewrite the budget. Because shifting the budget would alter nearly everything. That is how politics operates: on one side people debate; on the other, money flows. If you allowed me to decide the money’s destination, I would do it.
And what would you change specifically?
The interesting aspect of redirecting funds is that certain actions are indispensable. And it will be painful.
One of these is redirecting a substantial portion of funding away from agricultural subsidies. Redirecting funding away from agricultural support does not mean abandoning farmers. Rather, it means rethinking how we structure support for rural communities, moving away from treating agriculture as a purely commercial activity.
Because farming is a business. There are many highly productive farmers, and we should build on that. But we also need to cushion the impact for all those rural communities that will be affected.
“When Ukraine joins the European Union, it will bring in an enormous number of highly productive farmers”
That is the same issue we are discussing in the context of Ukraine. When Ukraine joins the European Union, it will contribute a large number of highly productive farmers. And many other farmers who are less productive will bear consequences. We must help them now transition away from unproductive practices. That does not mean removing them from agriculture. We should make them more productive in new ways, integrate them into rural communities differently, and support those communities.
Because, frankly, a lot of the work you and I do could be done from a rural community. Yet rural communities are not built to accommodate us. Perhaps we should rethink that.
Thank you very much.
