The Giorgia Meloni government shows signs of wear, and the polls point to a possible technical tie with the opposition, which obliges the parties on that side to accelerate negotiations to form a potential alternative coalition. Here is the current panorama: on the right, Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) 26.2% (down 0.5%), Forza Italia (FI) 9% (down 0.5%), Lega 5.8% (down 2.9%) — while the ultra-right party of Roberto Vannacci is growing (4.1%) — and on the opposition, Partito Democratico (PD) 22.3% (up 3.3%), Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) 13.2% (down 2.2%), Alleanza Verdi Sinistra (AVS) 6.7% (up 3.1%), and the centrists of Italia Viva (IV) 2% and Azione (AZ) 3%, which in 2022 ran in a coalition (7.7%), retreat by 2.7%. In total, all the right add up to 46.1% and all the opposition to 46.6%, according to YouTrend’s April poll. Hence it is now crucial for all parties to push the announced, yet another electoral reform, since the current Rosatellum seems exhausted, something that appears difficult and slower than Meloni would wish.
“To the opposition, what unites them is the rejection of Meloni, but this is not enough to win, for they lack a coalition structure, a common government program and a leader”
In principle, the right-wing government has the edge over the opposition, not only because being in power is always an advantage, but because FdI is much stronger than Lega and FI, while in the possible progressive coalition the gap between the leading party (PD) and the second (M5S) is quite small, all this without counting the centrists’ ambiguity. The opposition is united by their rejection of Meloni, but that is not enough to win, since they lack a coalition structure, a common government program, and a leader. And those three objectives are not easy to achieve.
In principle, the opposition parties are aware that to defeat Meloni they must inevitably seek forms of understanding (the long field, i.e., the broad field), with the PD and M5S as the main formations, and the truth is that the relations between the two parties are complicated and oscillate between tactical collaboration and competition. Giuseppe Conte (M5S) maintains that the program must be established first, since there are not insignificant differences in foreign and economic policy between M5S and PD, and only then would they agree on the coalition’s leader. Additionally, for now there is no consensus on the method of selection (open primaries?, an agreement among party elites?). Open primaries could possibly give Conte more opportunities against Elly Schlein (PD), whom the M5S does not want to see as the leader of the eventual coalition. Despite the difficulties, regional-level agreements between the two parties have been tried and have worked (in Sardinia, for example), although it is known that regional dynamics differ from national ones.
Conte has no rush to formalize a progressive coalition, since his objective is to reduce the distance between M5S and PD and to better distribute the internal balances of that alliance in order to have then the maximum leverage. Therefore, he benefits from the lack of opposition within his party and promotes a strategy more competitive than cooperative.
Many fewer problems present AVS (Angelo Bonelli and Nicola Fratoianni), because they are determined to forge an alliance between M5S and PD, while mistrusting the centrists. This is precisely where a significant difficulty lies: Matteo Renzi (IV) seems more favorable to participating in the long field proposal, but Carlo Calenda (AZ) is far more ambiguous and is quite close to the center-right, not to mention that IV would like to push the PD’s moderate wing ahead of Schlein. Consequently, if Renzi’s support is already partial, Calenda’s support has not materialized; in fact, he has stated that the long field spanning from AVS to AZ is unviable due to its excessive heterogeneity and would reproduce the errors of the contradictory and conflictive experiences of the Olive Tree and the Union, hence his proposal is to establish a third autonomous liberal-centrist pole that rejects bipolarity.
“The PD does not seem clear about whom it wants to represent, and today its base lies in urban middle-to-upper sectors”
The main responsibility for a possible alternative to Meloni falls on the PD, a party that carries historic shortcomings in form and substance to the point that it has been described by some analysts as an unsuitable or even mistaken party. Indeed: 1) the PD is a party that overlays very different elements (former communists and former Christian Democrats), being highly heterogeneous and highly current-driven; 2) it has been structured as a professional-electoral party with little social and territorial rooting; 3) although formally in the Party of the European Socialists, the PD is not a coherent social-democratic party, and 4) some of its policies are very contradictory and sometimes contrary to the historical tradition of the advanced left. On one side, there is a conservatism in the apparatus and most mid-level cadres, and on the other, abandoning factories and neighborhoods has made the PD almost useless for workers and the working classes. It is striking the labor and social insensitivity of many PD figures who have internalized neoliberal prescriptions with superficially modernizing discourses. Therefore, the PD has taken shape as a vaguely center-left party, and while it receives “useful vote,” it has a fairly volatile electorate due to its inconsistencies. Indeed, the PD does not seem clear about whom it wants to represent and today its bases are in urban middle-to-upper sectors, with skilled profiles in the service sector and a predominance of graduates, a civil-liberties-progressive electorate but socioeconomically conservative, i.e., not particularly favorable to market regulation and higher taxes on the well-to-do.
Schlein has undertaken to change all this: minimize internal factionalism, push for fair and inclusive social policies, and defend European integration and international multilateralism. Although she has not eradicated factionalism, she has reduced it and has imposed a strategic line that prioritizes first agreeing with the M5S, albeit out of mutual necessity. Although she won the PD primaries (in February 2023, with 53.8%), she faces substantial internal opposition in part of the party apparatus and among mid-level cadres who consider her too left-leaning despite her moderate style, although today there is no alternative. The PD secretary has many opponents within her party (Paolo Gentiloni, Piero Fassino, Dario Franceschini, the mayor of Genoa, Silvia Salis, very close to Renzi, and the historic Walter Veltroni, among others) who, with varying nuances and levels of contestation, do not share her orientation. Nevertheless, she has many assets: 1) she is the first woman to lead the main opposition party and is a clear counterpoint to Meloni, to whom she offers firm opposition; 2) she has been reinforced after the justice referendum (a minority of the PD supported Meloni’s reform); 3) she fully embraces the PD’s internal pluralism, but opposes the possible crystallization of organized, paralysing, and divisive factions, and 4) she has reoriented her message toward social concerns to win over the working and popular classes (hence her opponents say she has become “sanchista” due to her stance against Donald Trump and her criticism of Israel). All this without renouncing Romano Prodi’s legacy regarding effectively shaping broad alliances.
“The PD has not resolved its internal contradiction between two sensibilities that, in fact, embody two strategic lines”
In Italy, the left cannot win unless it captures the majority of centrists, which has pros and cons: with them, elections can be won, but it then becomes difficult to push very advanced socio-economic agendas. The PD has not resolved its internal contradiction between two sensibilities that actually embody two strategic lines: to privilege agreement with the populists (M5S) and the left (AVS) or to partner with the centrists (IV and AZ) to distance themselves from the first group. Schlein’s challenge is to maintain the cohesion of both currents and attempt to promote a broadly progressive project despite the moderates’ resistance. This faction is reluctant to align with M5S and AVS and is clearly in favor of IV and AZ, as it opposes Schlein’s leftward tilt, which, in its view, would push the PD toward marginalization and make alternation impossible. For the PD’s moderates, Schlein would be changing the PD’s original foundations and its nature as a center-left party to tilt it exclusively toward the left. In other words, Schlein is seen as too “radical” by the PD’s moderate wing due to her economic and social proposals, European and international stance, and alliances, as well as her approach. By contrast, the faction backing Schlein argues that chasing centrists and distancing from M5S and AVS would lead to irrelevance and disappoint the disadvantaged.
In conclusion, the main problem for the opposition in Italy is that all its members are needed (from AVS to AZ) to defeat Meloni, a reality already demonstrated by the Prodi governments that defeated Silvio Berlusconi. Inevitably, a coalition spanning from the radical left to the center-right, not Melonian, will force compromises that are not very ambitious, while also requiring balancing the potential coercion from its extremes; these are the main challenges it will have to confront if it manages to win in 2027, which is by no means easy.
