From Judge John Cronan (S.D.N.Y.) today in Combs v. Mitchell:
Plaintiff Sean Combs is a renowned recording artist who goes by the stage names Diddy, P. Diddy, and Puff Daddy. In September 2024, he faced an indictment in this district on charges including racketeering, sex trafficking, and transporting individuals to engage in prostitution, and in July 2025 a jury acquitted him of racketeering and sex trafficking while convicting him on the count of transporting people to engage in prostitution.
This case centers on statements directed at Combs in the interval between his indictment and his trial. Combs contends that Defendant Courtney Burgess falsely claimed that she possessed video recordings showing Combs sexually assaulting celebrities and minors. He further alleges that Defendant Ariel Mitchell—an attorney who represented Burgess—endorsed Burgess’s allegations and made her own false statements, including that a police report corroborated an accusation of rape against Combs (likely referring to Burgess) in 2018, and that Combs had used drug-laced baby oil to render his victims unconscious. Finally, Combs asserts that Defendant Nexstar Media Inc. (“Nexstar”) amplified these falsehoods by airing them on NewsNation without investigation and despite reasons to doubt their truth….
Burgess hadn’t appeared to defend himself, so this opinion doesn’t address the claims against him. However, the court dismissed most, though not all, claims against Nexstar:
Combs’s defamation claim against Nexstar rests on four of the seven allegedly defamatory statements—Statements 1, 2, 4, and 5. Each statement stems from NewsNation’s dissemination of assertions made by Mitchell or by both Mitchell and Burgess. Statement 1 consists of Burgess’s October 31, 2024 assertion that video recordings existed of Combs sexually assaulting minors and celebrities; Statement 2 is Mitchell’sOctober 31 assertion that Combs secretly recorded himself engaging in sexual activity with individuals unaware of the recording; Statement 4 is Mitchell’s September 27, 2024 assertion that a police report corroborated Burgess’s claim that Combs raped her in 2018; and Statement 5 is Mitchell’s October 7, 2024 assertion that Combs used drug-laced baby oil to incapacitate people.
As to Statements 1, 2, and 4, Combs has failed to plead plausible grounds for inferring actual malice (i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard) on the part of Nexstar. Where a publisher broadcasts allegations made by a third party, actual malice exists only where there are clear reasons to doubt the informant’s truthfulness or the accuracy of his reports. Even conduct that is wildly unreasonable and a stark departure from standard investigative and reporting practices ordinarily followed by responsible publishers cannot, on its own, establish actual malice.
Admittedly, Combs contends that NewsNation conducted no investigation, performed no fact-checking, and never sought comment from Combs’s representatives. Yet, a mere failure to investigate, by itself, does not prove reckless disregard. Likewise, although Combs asserts that NewsNation profited from airing Mitchell’s statements by attracting viewers, a publisher’s motive for publishing does not by itself supply a sufficient basis for finding actual malice. Even when these two factors are considered together, they do not suffice to establish a plausible inference of a “purposeful avoidance of the truth” required for actual malice at the pleading stage. If they did, any profit-driven news outlet could be liable for neglecting to investigate, contrary to the principle that a publisher is not obliged to pursue competing stories merely to shield itself from a finding of actual malice.
Combs also argues that NewsNation should have recognized Mitchell’s and Burgess’s credibility deficits. He asserts that Mitchell has a documented history of making false claims about celebrities, largely based on an unproven accusation that Mitchell engaged in witness-tampering in a prior suit where Combs was initially named as a defendant. But the Amended Complaint does not allege that anyone at NewsNation responsible for the broadcasts actually knew of Mitchell’s alleged history, and even if they had, an unproven accusation does not supply “obvious reasons” to deem everything Mitchell subsequently stated to be false….
With respect to Statement 5, however, Combs has alleged facts that, given the relaxed pleading standard, permit a plausible inference that NewsNation acted with actual malice. The Amended Complaint contends that Mitchell’s claims—that baby oil could function as a “conduit” for delivering drugs “mixed into the oil” and that Combs had doused her client with drug-laced baby oil to “lower[] her defenses”—were so inherently unlikely that broadcasting those statements would be reckless absent further investigation.
According to the Amended Complaint, “there is no scientific basis for asserting that baby oil could be infused with drugs to incapacitate anyone,” and the court found it plausible that anyone who heard such a claim would, at minimum, entertain serious doubts about its truth—even if they could not confirm its falsehood. Cf. Khawar v. Globe Int’l, Inc. (Cal. 1998) (upholding a finding of actual malice against a tabloid that republished the “highly improbable claim” that a bystander, rather than Sirhan Sirhan, killed Robert F. Kennedy). Of course, this is not a ruling that Combs will necessarily prevail on Statement 5, but for purposes of the current motion, his claim of actual malice is sufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6)….
And the court allowed Combs’s claims against Mitchell to proceed more broadly, relying not only on Statement 5 but on all four statements mentioned above and on two additional allegations: (i) that the plaintiff “used secretly recorded videos of him having sex with people who did not know they were being recorded” to threaten or extort sexual partners, and (ii) that the plaintiff sexually assaulted and/or threatened, exploited, or secretly recorded “hundreds, maybe thousands of people.” Here is part of the analysis:
[A.] Mitchell contends that Combs has not alleged facts showing she made statements of fact because her comments about her client’s police report and the “shopping around” of sex tapes are not capable of being proven true or false, all her remarks merely echo others’ statements, and any statements that can be attributed solely to her are “pure opinion” or “rhetorical hyperbole.”
Mitchell’s position misses the mark. Whether a specific police report corroborates an accusation of rape and whether a particular sex tape exists are clearly factual matters that are capable of being proven true or false. Even if Mitchell was simply relaying Burgess’s account, it remains a black-letter rule that anyone who republishes a libel or slander may be held liable—even if the defamatory statement is attributed to the original publisher.
Finally, Mitchell’s assertions that Combs sexually assaulted celebrities and minors, secretly recorded his sexual partners, used those recordings to extort people, drugged a woman with drug-laced baby oil, and victimized “hundreds, maybe thousands of people” are not mere nonactionable opinion or hyperbole; they carry precise meanings that listeners can reasonably interpret. Nor would the setting of interviews on national news programs, a documentary, and the courthouse steps, presented by an attorney with firsthand familiarity with the evidence, signal to listeners that what is heard is not likely to be true.
[B.] Mitchell argues that her statements are protected by New York’s common-law privilege for statements made during judicial proceedings and by the fair report privilege codified at Section 74 of the New York Civil Rights Law… [But, among other issues], each of Mitchell’s statements was made to the media rather than inside a judicial proceeding. [And], Mitchell’s statements were not a “fair and true report” of any official proceedings because Combs alleges that what she said “suggested more serious conduct than that actually suggested in [any] official proceeding.”
[C.] [As to actual malice,] Combs contends that Mitchell repeatedly professed personal knowledge of evidence that did not exist and that she had no basis to believe existed…. Actual malice may be found where a story is fabricated by the defendant or is the product of his imagination. For instance, Mitchell asserted she could “tell that the video [of Combs] is pornographic in nature,” even though Combs contends she “never possessed” any such video. She claimed to have “a police report,” even though it is alleged there is no police report. She asserted to have conducted “research” showing that baby oil can transmit incapacitating drugs, even though she allegedly “performed no such research, and even if she had, there is no scientific basis for asserting that baby oil could be infused with drugs to incapacitate anyone.”
In fact, Mitchell herself states that she “did not even know Burgess” at the time of the September 27, 2024 interview, which suggests she had no basis at all to believe the truth of any of her statements during that interview. If the court accepts the truth of Combs’s allegations at this stage, he has plausibly pleaded actual malice by Mitchell. In short, one cannot engage in this kind of groundless speculation and then shield oneself behind the doctrine of actual malice.
