Second Amendment Roundup: ATF Firearm and Frame-or-Receiver Rules Declared Invalid

The Court in Bondi v. VanDerStok (2025) dismissed a challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) 2022 Final Rule that broadened the definitions of “firearm” and “frame or receiver.” While this decision addressed that procedural challenge, the Justices did not entertain the constitutional challenges raised by Defense Distributed. In a ruling issued on August 17 in Defense Distributed v. Blanche, Judge Reed O’Connor of the Northern District of Texas held the regulations unconstitutionally vague and in violation of the Second Amendment.

Back in 1968, Congress defined “firearm” in the Gun Control Act to include “any weapon … which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive” and “the frame or receiver of any such weapon.”  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).  At the same time, ATF’s predecessor defined “frame or receiver” as “that part of a firearm which provides housing for the hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing mechanism, and which is usually threaded at its forward portion to receive the barrel.”  33 F.R. 18558 (1968).  Those boundaries remained until 2022 when the Biden-era ATF chose to overhaul these longstanding definitions under the pretext of addressing “ghost guns.”

Merely quoting the Final Rule’s definition for “frame or receiver,” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c)(c), reveals its own vagueness. It covers “a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver … that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted” into a firearm, but excludes “a forging, casting, printing, extrusion, unmachined body, or similar article that has not yet reached a stage of manufacture where it is clearly identifiable as an unfinished component part of a weapon (e.g., unformed block of metal, liquid polymer, or other raw material).” As the court noted, determining when a lump of metal or plastic reaches that stage is left to the ATF’s subjective judgment.

The Biden administration’s regulation further states that ATF “may consider any associated templates, jigs, molds, equipment, tools, instructions, guides, or marketing materials that are sold, distributed, or possessed with [or otherwise made available to the purchaser or recipient of] the item or kit.” Yet it does not specify with precision which materials the agency regards as relevant for this inquiry.

In addition, the rule added a gloss to the definition of “firearm” as “a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.”  27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (“firearm”).

The term “readily” is problematic enough when used in the statutory text—what it means for something to “readily” be converted to expel a projectile—and it becomes even more hopelessly vague when applied in the Final Rule. As the court observed, “It is hard to see how ‘readily’ in the context of an already formed weapon and ‘readily’ in the context of a block of metal or plastic and a jig or template are synonymous.”

The parties did not dispute that manufacturing or repairing firearms falls within the Second Amendment. Under Bruen, the burden shifts to the government to show that the regulation aligns with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. But the historical analogues cited by the government fell short. Only two states in the early republic required firearm barrels to be “proved” (tested) and stamped to certify their strength and safety. In Bruen, the Supreme Court questioned whether “three colonial regulations could suffice to demonstrate a tradition of public-carry regulation.” The “why” of the Final Rule was to aid crime control through tracing firearms and, theoretically, restricting their acquisition by people barred from possession, whereas the “how” of the older statutes relied on inspecting and marking a barrel and collecting a fee, while the modern rule centers on regulating parts and raw materials used to manufacture firearms. The same line of reasoning distinguishes gunpowder storage rules at the Founding era that safeguarded the public from volatile explosives from today’s rule aimed at crime control.

Not only did the Final Rule lack historical analogues, the court found, it also ran contrary to the actual historical practice of personalized gunsmithing. Self-manufacture of firearms in America was widespread and even foundational to the nation’s founding. During the colonial era, the Revolutionary period, and the early republic, Americans were urged to craft firearms to arm the citizenry. The court cited Joseph Greenlee, “The American Tradition of Self-Made Arms,” 54 St. Mary’s L.J. 35 (2023).

Consequently, the court declared that 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 and 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c) are unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It further enjoined enforcement of these provisions against Defense Distributed, the Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), or any current or future SAF members, but only to the extent it concerns the products named in the complaint—M1911 80% Frames and the G80 Build Kit, Unfinished Receiver, and Grip Module. The practical effect is that the firm can sell the items and SAF members may purchase them without requiring them to be distributed as firearms through a federal firearms licensee.

Defense Distributed could have a broader impact, particularly if upheld and elaborated on by the Fifth Circuit, by prompting courts to construe terms like “readily” in a stricter fashion, whether these terms appear in regulations or statutes. The vague nature of “readily” might be mitigated somewhat by the requirement that the government prove the individual knew that the weapon possessed the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition….” Staples v. U.S. (1994).

Some definitions of “assault weapons” include references to components that can be “readily” assembled into a functioning unit. In a case I litigated years ago, it was decided that the phrase “may be readily assembled” does not furnish enough information to enable a person of average intelligence to determine whether a particular combination of parts falls within the ordinance’s coverage. Peoples Rights Organization v. City of Columbus (6th Cir. 1998).

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On September 4, President Trump issued a pardon to Navy veteran Patrick Tate Adamiak, who was serving a 20-year sentence after being convicted of violations of the National Firearms Act. The matter involved cut-up machinegun parts and an inert, incomplete grenade launcher. He had filed a petition for a writ of certiorari arguing that the NFA’s definitions of “machinegun” and “destructive device” each contain multiple definitions, 26 U.S.C. §5845, but the indictment failed to allege which definitions applied. The petition was denied on May 18.

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