Second Circuit: Stop Granting a Legal Pass to Antisemitic Violence

November 18, 2026

Torres v. Carlson, presently before the Second Circuit, is a lawsuit brought by two janitors at Columbia University under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the KKK Act).

According to the complaint, masked participants affiliated with Columbia University’s anti-Israel coalition, equipped with hammers, knives, bolt cutters, chains, and zip ties, entered Hamilton Hall at Columbia and confronted the two workers. The janitors’ refusal to back down provoked the attackers, who then assaulted them, detained them, and directed slurs toward them such as “Jew-lovers,” “Jew-workers,” and “Zionists.” The rioters took control of the building, smashed windows to lock the doors, barricaded themselves inside, and unfurled banners proclaiming an “Intifada.”

Assuming the allegations are accurate, this appears to be a straightforward case under the KKK Act, which the Supreme Court has described as reaching organized mob violence aimed at a protected group and those perceived as allied with it. See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).

Nevertheless, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jon D. Michael of UCLA Law School, Matthew Segal of Tufts, and I have submitted an amicus brief to the Second Circuit, challenging the district court’s decision to:

(1) resolve at the pleading stage questions of motive in the defendants’ favor, accepting the defendants’ description of their own motives over the plaintiffs’ allegations and deeming explicit antisemitic epithets irrelevant;

(2) treat alleged political motive as categorically negating discriminatory animus—disregarding both the mixed-motive framework that operates across federal antidiscrimination law and the settled principle that speech, even when political in nature, can evidence discriminatory intent; and,

(3) view Jewish disagreement about whether all anti-Zionism is inherently antisemitic as dispositive proof that the specific anti-Zionist rhetoric in this case was not plausibly antisemitic—a standard that conflicts with binding precedent, contradicts how courts apply antidiscrimination law to groups other than Jews, and improperly grants any individual Jew the power to veto discrimination claims by all other Jews.

As a side note, there are several federal court decisions arising from protest activity after October 7 that many, including myself, view as applying stricter standards to civil rights plaintiffs alleging anti-Jewish violations of civil rights laws than precedent would suggest applies to other plaintiffs.

Finally, to be fair to Jon and Matthew, I should acknowledge that they were the principal authors of the brief.

Natalie Foster

I’m a political writer focused on making complex issues clear, accessible, and worth engaging with. From local dynamics to national debates, I aim to connect facts with context so readers can form their own informed views. I believe strong journalism should challenge, question, and open space for thoughtful discussion rather than amplify noise.