On the eve of the summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping in China, Agenda Pública has consulted a number of public policy experts, analysts and former senior government officials about the upcoming meeting between the leaders of the two major world powers. Here is what they told us.
Alexander B. Gray, senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and former White House NSC chief of staff from 2019 to 2021:
The upcoming summit between the United States and China is an important opportunity for Washington to recalibrate the economic relationship in a way that serves the United States’ national security and economic interests. China’s ability to coerce the United States economically, whether in the pharmaceutical sphere or in the realm of rare earth minerals, has demonstrated the need to rebuild internal industrial resilience so that the United States has more policy options in the future.
“The capacity of Beijing to exercise economic coercion against the United States has demonstrated the need to rebuild internal industrial resilience”
The president Trump seems to understand that, to buy time until the industrial policies his administration is pushing take effect, the United States needs a relationship with China that is fundamentally stable in the near term. This stability will benefit the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and Asia, and will offer a unique opportunity for allies to collaborate in order to bolster their economic-security resilience in the face of the malign activity that China continues to pursue.
Scott Shaw, vice president of The Cohen Group and nonresident senior fellow at the Asia Society. Shaw was a senior Foreign Service official, who retired in 2024 after a 36-year career at the U.S. Department of Commerce with the rank of Counselor. He also served as Deputy Under Secretary for China and Mongolia at the U.S. Department of Commerce:
I think one of the most significant outcomes of the summit will be the announcement of a Trade Council and perhaps an Investment Council. While both would be relevant, we will need to see what their structures are to gauge how durable these new mechanisms will be.
“One of the most significant outcomes of the summit will be the announcement of a Trade Council and perhaps an Investment Council”
My expectation, based on similar bilateral formats from the past, is that they will be useful through 2026 as the two leaders meet three or four times more during the year. But, given that the two sides appear to have different objectives for these formats, when high-level leadership at the cabinet or ministerial level winds down after this annual marathon of leader-level meetings, the challenge will be to make these formats solid and effective.
Lucas F. Schleusener, former U.S. Department of Defense official (2012-2017), with experience in U.S.-China relations, and speechwriter for former Defense Secretaries Leon Panetta, Chuck Hagel and Ash Carter:
The Trump-Xi summit should be understood less as an opportunity for decisive progress and more as a test of resilience for the United States’ policy-making capacity. I would expect the agenda to include trade, technology controls, critical minerals, Taiwan, military-to-military communications, and China’s role in managing the effects arising from the war with Iran, especially the pressure on energy markets, East Asian economies, and food security in parts of the Global South. Washington arrives at this meeting after weakening precisely the machinery that makes presidential diplomacy effective: the National Security Council process, key cabinet agencies, and much of the United States’ development capacity.
“The summit should be understood less as an opportunity for decisive progress than as a test of resilience for the United States’ policy-making capacity”
That leaves the United States seeking Chinese cooperation from a position of lesser influence, and Xi Jinping will clearly understand those vulnerabilities. The most likely outcome is not a lasting strategic realignment, but limited tactical understandings that preserve space for dialogue while Beijing seeks advantages in Washington’s volatility. For U.S. allies and partners, the question is not just what is said at the summit, but whether Washington can turn leader-to-leader dialogue into a coherent strategy. Tailored diplomacy does not substitute for a disciplined process, technical expertise, coordination with allies, nor a clear theory of American interests.
Dominic Chiu, senior China and Northeast Asia analyst at Eurasia Group:
The summit will be defined less by spectacular advances than by a shared interest in maintaining stability. I anticipate a positive display and the announcement of outcomes that are relatively easy to achieve. Among them are Chinese commitments to purchase American agricultural and energy products and Boeing aircraft, as well as the announcement of a Trade Council to formalize dialogue and allow selective tariff adjustments. We will probably see a preview of these results after the technical-level trade talks in Seoul a day before the summit. Neither side currently has an interest in escalating tariff tensions. The Section 301 investigations are likely to modestly raise tariffs on China by the end of summer, though they will remain below the maximum levels under the IEEPA. China could respond with a marginal rise in its own tariffs, but it will be calibrated. It is crucial to point out that I do not expect any new tariffs to be tied to fentanyl, which removes a key political tension factor for Beijing that otherwise could have complicated the summit environment.
The Iran war undoubtedly adds complexity to the conversations. The recent U.S. sanctions on Chinese entities that import Iranian oil and Beijing’s blockade measures as retaliation will not escalate tensions, but they indicate that the Chinese are firmer in countering Washington’s coercive measures. I expect Trump to urge Xi to increase pressure on Iran regarding the blockade and to cease the purchase of Iranian oil. There may be some reference in the official communique after the summit that emphasizes concern about the situation, but I do not think there will be substantive coordination between the two countries beyond that.
“Beijing keeps close its rare earths card and calculates it will have more influence over Trump as midterm elections approach”
No, we do not expect the summit to yield a preventive extension of the tariff and export-control truce, whose deadline is October 30. If it did occur, however, it would be a clearly positive signal for markets, as it would remove a key source of uncertainty before the midterm elections. It is more likely that technology and investment agreements will be postponed. Beijing keeps close its rare-earths card and calculates that it will have more influence over Trump as the midterm elections approach. The question remains Taiwan. We expect talks on a further postponement of U.S. arms sales to the island. A verbal shift in the White House’s official stance on Taiwan independence is not our central scenario, but cannot be ruled out, given that both leaders will have plenty of private time together without senior officials to caution Trump against making that concession to Xi. If Trump were to adopt a firmer stance against Taiwan independence, the consequences for cross-strait dynamics and for the United States’ credibility in the region would weigh more heavily than any other issue discussed at the summit.
Zack Cooper, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute:
This summit will be more about optics than substantive outcomes. The two leaders will undoubtedly announce some Chinese purchases alongside several of the top U.S. chief executives, but it is unlikely they will meaningfully address the underlying structural issues in the U.S.–China relationship: trade and Taiwan.
This means that, even if the relationship appears more stable in the short term, the two leaders are not making progress that would guarantee long-term stability and guard against crises.
Leland Lazarus, CEO and founder of Lazarus Consulting:
Both sides come to this meeting with the sense that they have leverage over the other. It is likely that Xi will seize this hosting opportunity to present China as a global stabilizing force, in contrast to Trump, who could come across as a bull in a china shop. Xi is likely to offer to buy more American agricultural products and Boeing aircraft, as well as to increase pressure on Iran to capitulate.
In return, Xi will want Trump to further ease restrictions on chip exports and to issue a stronger statement against Taiwan independence. But what we do not know is how much each side is really suffering or what their true red line is.
Ali Wyne, senior research and advocacy advisor for U.S.–China relations at the International Crisis Group:
Although it is unlikely that the summit yields major breakthroughs, it is essential that Trump and Xi maintain regular dialogue, especially because their relationship is likely to play a disproportionate role in shaping U.S.–China relations during the remainder of Trump’s second term.
“Although it is unlikely that the summit yields major breakthroughs, it is essential that Trump and Xi maintain regular dialogue”
The two leaders should prioritise two tasks in Beijing: extend the trade truce they reached in Busan last October and express joint support for Iran’s return to negotiations. Chinese officials have indicated that Taiwan will also occupy a prominent place on the agenda. Although it is unlikely that Trump will shift the White House’s official policy on the Taiwan Strait, he may be open to discussing U.S. weapons sales to the island, thereby breaking with more than four decades of precedent.
