European Union budget rarely sparks a public conversation outside Brussels, but so many concrete things depend on it: farmers, regions, fishermen, infrastructure, security, innovation, or students. That is why the negotiations for the next seven-year multiannual financial framework are not merely a technical discussion among institutions, but a test of what Europe wants to be in the coming seven years. As European Parliament member Siegfried Mureșan summarizes, “Europe has to do more, and we cannot do more with a smaller budget.”
Mureșan, a member of the European People’s Party and one of the co-rapporteurs of the European Parliament in this negotiation, argues that the Commission was right to strengthen competitiveness, research, innovation, and security, but wrong to weaken traditional policies. His idea is clear: “There is no contradiction between competitiveness and cohesion.” For him, cohesion must evolve, funding more green, digital, energy, or even dual-use civilian and military projects, but without losing its territorial base or the role of the regions.
The conversation also resolves how to pay for all of this. Mureșan rejects the notion that member states are willing to dramatically increase their contributions and turns to “own resources,” including a tax on big tech giants. On common debt, by contrast, he is far more cautious. NextGenerationEU continues to weigh on European accounts and, he reminds, “if you accumulate too much debt, you end up paying the financial markets instead of investing in hospitals, in improvements to the energy grid, or in farmers.”
Good morning, Mr. Mureșan, and thank you for taking the time to discuss the European Union’s new budget. My first question is: what are the main problems with the Commission’s proposal for the multiannual financial framework (MFF)?
We are now working on drafting the European Union budget for the next seven years. The budget is always organized in seven-year periods because we need long-term predictability. The beneficiaries of European funds must know how much money will come, under what conditions, and in which areas. Moreover, large infrastructure projects require long-term planning: you cannot build a highway in a single year. That is why we always plan for seven years.
These cycles matter because they clearly show the European Union’s real priorities. Now it is clear that, for the coming years, the priorities will be, on the one hand, security and defense, and on the other, a strong, competitive economy adapted to the digital era and to artificial intelligence. These are the new priorities.
At the same time, the EU’s traditional priorities —the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which funds farmers and rural development, and the cohesion policy— have shown their value and importance over time, and must continue. The cohesion policy has become the Union’s main investment tool. Many infrastructures were built precisely with this cohesion policy in Spain and in other Member States.
We are now in this process. The European Commission, which is the European Union’s executive power, has presented a budget project. In that project, it proposes more money for competitiveness, research, innovation, and security. That is correct, and as Parliament, we support it.
However, it also proposed weakening the Common Agricultural Policy and the cohesion policy, reducing funding for farmers and regions. We believe that is a mistake, we do not support it, and we are trying to correct it. Three weeks ago we adopted the European Parliament’s official position, noting that the Commission’s budget proposal is insufficient. We want to increase it by 10% so that there is enough money also for farmers and regions.
“We do not want Madrid and Brussels to decide for every region of Spain. We want decisions to be taken close to citizens, which is why we propose strengthening agriculture and cohesion policy”
We want the role of the regions to be binding and mandatory. We want European funds to be managed and decided at regional and local levels, because they are closer to the citizens. Regions know best where money is needed. We do not want Brussels and national capitals to politically decide where the money goes. We do not want Madrid and Brussels to decide for every region of Spain. We want decisions to be taken close to the citizens, which is why we propose strengthening agriculture and cohesion policy.
There are two other issues vital for Spain. The European Commission proposed a drastic cut to the fishing policy, dropping from €6 billion in the current budget to only €2 billion in the next one. That would be unacceptable. As Parliament, we reject it outright. We argue that we need €7 billion for fishermen in the next budget. Fishermen contribute to food security just as farmers do; they are a vital part of our economy and we must support them. As one of the two co-rapporteurs of the Parliament, I have fought hard for this.
The second crucial issue for Spain is the outermost regions. In the current budget there is a special fund for outermost regions: the islands of Spain and Portugal, such as the Azores and Madeira, and France’s overseas regions. The European Commission proposed eliminating this special program, telling countries like Spain, Portugal, and France that, if they want to support these regions, they should do so with their ordinary cohesion funds.
I think that is a mistake. The outermost regions are essential for the entire European Union, especially in the current geopolitical context, where they are vital for our security. That is why the European Parliament proposes recreating the special program for these regions and funding it with €7,000 million. In the current budget there were €6,000 million; a bit more is needed so that financing areas like the Canary Islands does not become an unfair burden on the Spanish government. All of Europe must contribute to it, and that is what we argued in the Parliament’s position, gaining the support of the majority of MEPs.
Mureșan outlines the European Parliament’s priorities for the new multiannual financial framework. Photo: Agenda Pública
Permit me to ask how you plan to secure that funding. We have options like common debt or own resources. What avenues are you exploring in that regard?
Yes, Europe has to do more, and we cannot do more with a smaller budget. That’s wishful thinking; it simply won’t work in practice. So it is clear the budget must increase, though, of course, that increase must be responsible and moderate. We cannot spend more in absolutely every area.
“It is very hard to tell voters: ‘Look, we are paying more from our national budgets to Europe.’ A large increase in national contributions is unrealistic”
There are two ways to raise it. The first possibility is that each member state contributes more to the EU budget. Personally, I do not think that will happen, because many member states are facing huge deficits and high levels of debt. Politically, there is no will for it, and it is very hard to tell voters: “Look, we are paying more from our national budgets to Europe.” A large increase in national contributions is unrealistic.
So the second possibility remains: introducing the so-called “own resources” of revenues for the European Union, which would make the Union’s budget far more predictable, transparent, automatic, and objective. As the European Parliament, we have three ideas, one of which is much broader and more significant than the others.
The first idea is to introduce an own resource based on taxing global tech giants.
Which, of course, will not be easy.
You are absolutely right. I will come back to that point. The second is a digital contribution based on the profits earned with cryptocurrencies. And the third is an own resource based on gaming and online betting.
The digital levy — or digital tax — would be the one that would raise the most revenue. But you are right; I am not naive. It would affect American digital companies and, in the transatlantic context, it will not be easy to implement. Yet the world’s largest tech giants have access to our single market of nearly 500 million consumers. They earn billions of dollars here and yet pay not a single euro in EU taxes. That is deeply unfair.
“It is unfair that global giants reap enormous benefits from our market while contributing not a single cent”
The choice we face is simple: either we cut funding for Spanish farmers, Spanish regions, and communities across Europe — in other words, reduce money for farming, regional development, innovation, energy, and security — or we tax Elon Musk. Each can weigh the options, but I would much rather not penalize our own companies, farmers, and regions, and to find a structural solution. It is unjust that global giants reap enormous benefits from our market while paying not a single cent. If we let this continue while cutting funds for European beneficiaries, we would be making a serious mistake. Those giants should pay for access to the European market.
There is a debate underway about budget priorities, specifically whether cohesion or competitiveness should take precedence. Although we may not have to choose one over the other, many regions are very worried about the Commission’s proposal for cohesion policy. It seems the Commission favors heavy investment in competitiveness. What is your view on this debate?
Yes, it is a fundamental point. Investing more in competitiveness is necessary and correct, but cohesion is an essential part of that equation; it is not a burden. The European Commission proposed reducing cohesion policy and guaranteeing funding only to the less developed regions of Europe. We believe that is a mistake; funding must be guaranteed for all types of regions, and the role of local governments must be binding.
“There is no contradiction between competitiveness and cohesion. Cohesion policy simply has to evolve, as it has in recent years”
We have worked closely with the European Commission over the past months and it has shifted its position somewhat, so we have made progress. But it is still not enough. We need a binding commitment with the regions, a clear cohesion policy with specific funding, and a solid legal basis so beneficiaries have regulatory certainty for the full seven years. Of course, within cohesion policy we need flexibility. If unexpected crises arise — like the energy crisis we just faced — we must be able to finance new kinds of projects dynamically.
My view is that there is no contradiction between competitiveness and cohesion. Cohesion policy simply has to evolve, as it has in recent years by financing more green, environmental, energy efficiency, and digital projects. Looking ahead, the link between cohesion policy and the new budget priorities must be explicitly clear. Most future cohesion projects will naturally contribute to economic competitiveness. We build a highway because it improves competitiveness. We invest in energy projects because they lower energy prices and make our economy more competitive.
Therefore, we should design a future-oriented cohesion policy together with governments, the Commission, the Parliament, and the regions. It must serve our major new objectives: competitiveness and security. For example, we could even finance military mobility through cohesion policy, supporting projects with dual civilian and military use. Cohesion is not an obsolete policy of the past; it is a vital investment for the future.
Mureșan argues that cohesion and competitiveness must advance together in the European budget. Photo: Agenda Pública
In that line, what do you think of the Commission’s alleged plan to dismantle DG REGIO?
Look, I don’t know what they’re planning behind closed doors. To put it in context, the European Commission is divided into several directorates-general, for agriculture, budget, etc. One of them is regional policy, DG REGIO, and I have also read reports in the press that the Commission wants to dissolve it. I can tell you directly that no one has consulted us in the European Parliament about this.
I can imagine.
To be fair, we do not consult the Commission either when organizing our own internal parliamentary structures; the executive power decides its organization and Parliament decides its own. However, eliminating that directorate-general at the European level would send a terrible signal to the regions, as if they were told they are no longer important.
I do not know exactly what the Commission’s reasoning would be, because I’ve only read public information, but I can confirm that there has been no discussion on this matter with the MEPs.
As we mentioned earlier, I want to ask you about common debt. What is your view? For example, figures like Friedrich Merz seem firmly against the idea.
Common debt may sound appealing on paper, but we’re seeing major risks at the European level. Let me be completely concrete and honest with your readers. Right after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, we launched the largest package of economic support in European history: NextGenerationEU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility. In total it was €700 billion, half in loans and half in grants for the member states.
This was possible only because we allowed the European Commission to issue common debt. The agreement at the time was that we faced a unique and unprecedented crisis. The economy was frozen, we were in lockdown, and countries like Spain and Italy were suffering greatly. We agreed that solidarity is an essential part of what we are as the European Union, so it was the right decision. In fact, I was one of the three European Parliament co-rapporteurs responsible for establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility. We did it, and it was the right response.
However, to do it we had to assume a huge debt, almost €700 billion, which now has to be repaid. And at this moment, it’s still not entirely clear who pays it and how.
In fact, that is exactly one of the biggest challenges for the budget.
Exactly. It is not clear how it will be repaid. The loan portion of the Recovery and Resilience Facility is straightforward: loans granted to member states, and those governments repay the money directly to the Commission. But €350 billion of that package was granted as grants, and we have to pay interest on that money each year. That is the real problem.
“If you accumulate too much debt, you end up paying the financial markets instead of investing in hospitals, in improvements to the energy grid, or in farmers”
As long as the repayment mechanism remains unclear, this poses a serious risk to the EU’s ordinary budget because, for now, the interest has to come out of our annual operating funds. We won’t start paying the principal until 2028, but we have been paying interest since 2022. At first, interest was manageable: €1 billion in the first year, €2 billion in the second, then €4 billion. This year it has risen to €8 billion. That’s €8 billion a year taken out of the EU budget just to pay interest.
Taking on debt is easy; paying it back is the hard part, and interest is a heavy burden. If you accumulate too much debt, you end up paying the financial markets instead of investing in hospitals, in upgrades to the energy network, or in farmers. I believe issuing additional common debt at the European level will be politically impossible until we have fully resolved the NextGenerationEU repayment framework. As I have noted, there is a risk it could swallow the budget. Right now we pay €8 billion a year in interest. After 2028, we will have to start repaying €25 billion of principal each year. That represents about 15% of the EU’s total budget.
So we face a tough reality: either we cut the European budget by 15%, or member states dramatically raise their national contributions — for which they do not have the money or the political will —, or we truly advance in “own resources” to generate new revenue streams to cover our debts. Until we resolve how to pay what we already owe, more common debt remains off the table.
The eurodeputy addresses the risks of common debt and budget negotiations ahead of the European electoral cycle. Photo: Agenda Pública
Looking ahead to 2027, we’ll see major elections across Europe: in Spain, France, Poland, and Italy. Is it worrying that there are so many pivotal elections when the EU budget has not yet been negotiated or approved?
Yes, I think it will be exceptionally difficult to close a seven-year EU budget while four of our five largest Member States are in the midst of intense election campaigns. The new budget should come into force on 1 January 2028. The ideal scenario is to reach an agreement before the end of this year, 2026. If we close it within that timeframe, national governments, regional authorities, and private beneficiaries will have a full year to prepare administrative frameworks, design programs, and guarantee a smooth rollout. Then, from January 1, 2028, the money would flow immediately and yield results.
If we do not reach an agreement before the end of 2026, the presidential elections in France and the parliamentary elections in Spain, Italy, and Poland will likely freeze all progress in 2027. We would end up blocked and only reach a rushed agreement in December 2027. Nothing would be ready by January 2028, which would cause major delays in funding and that would be detrimental to everyone.
Speaking of that point, think of someone like Giorgia Meloni, for example. It could be politically risky for her to back an EU budget just before elections. She may fear that approving it beforehand would create electoral problems at home.
Any prime minister would have enormous difficulties defending a bad budget to their voters, but it is very easy for a prime minister to back a strong and fair budget. If the budget is too small and forces cuts to funds for local farmers, regional infrastructures, or students, then yes, that prime minister has a serious electoral problem. However, if we achieve a sufficient, realistic, and supportive budget, it becomes excellent news for any leader seeking reelection.
As a member of the PPE, do you find it difficult to question a European Commission largely composed of members of your own political family?
Look, we must never forget the Parliament members’ fundamental duty: to supervise and hold the executive power to account. At the European level, the Commission answers directly to Parliament. It should not be expected that Parliament and the Commission agree on everything; that is not how democracy works.
What we need are shared central objectives, and I believe those common objectives exist clearly between the Commission and Parliament at this moment. Both want to strengthen security, improve competitiveness, and decisively reduce bureaucratic burdens during this term. Overall we are aligned. In daily implementation and in the specific funding lines, we debate intensely — sometimes with sharply opposing positions — but we always negotiate to find common European solutions. That is exactly Europe.
Thank you.
