In a recent trilogue, negotiators from the European Parliament (EP) and the Council agreed to significantly harden European migration policy by establishing “return centers” outside the EU.
The EP’s position rested on a majority formed by the European People’s Party (EPP), center-right, and the groups on the radical-right. But this is not an isolated shift in a single policy, but the symptom of a much deeper structural change.
The EP no longer operates on the basis of stable majorities between the European center-right and the pro-European center-left. Instead, it increasingly resembles something well known in national parliaments: a minority government, in this case with the EPP acting as the arbiter of majorities.
Understanding this new dynamic is essential for the European Commission, national governments, and anyone who wants to anticipate where European legislation is headed.
A New Way of Thinking
The EP, with its unique political setup, has never functioned as a traditional national parliament. It has never had a government-opposition structure in which a single party or a multi-party coalition backs the government. Instead, every majority is negotiated case by case, with barely a loose agreement among the major political groups to support a shared agenda.
“The position of the EP rested on a majority formed by the European People’s Party (EPP), center-right, and the radical-right groups. This is not a one-off shift”
Nevertheless, throughout the history of the EU, and up to 2019, the center-right group of the EPP and the center-left group of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) had always formed a majority. Between 2019 and 2024, the liberal Renew Europe group became necessary for the EPP and S&D to reach that majority. Still, this meant that, when there was agreement in the pro-European center—whose parties also formed part of the majorities in national governments—a majority could be built in the EP.
The Parliament elected in 2024 is different. It still depends on the EPP as the largest political group, which formed a majority with S&D and Renew to reelect Ursula von der Leyen as President of the Commission, shaping the so-called “Von der Leyen Platform.” But, as the legislature has progressed, growing distrust among the three groups has eclipsed their cooperation.
The loose “Von der Leyen Platform” is increasingly more like an external-support agreement.
“In the EP, each majority is negotiated case by case, with barely a loose agreement among the major political groups to support a shared agenda”
This means that the current decision-making dynamics in the EU are increasingly resembling a minority national government. Three features illustrate this shift: a central majority in pivotal votes, such as those on the European budget; the EPP’s ability to turn to different majorities; and the fact that the EPP can also find itself in the minority.
Entering Minority Mode
First, the “Von der Leyen Platform” — the majority formed by the EPP, S&D and Renew — still accounts for around 85% of plenary votes. All votes on the ordinary budget and the EU’s multiannual financial framework rest on the pro-European center.
But, as with many minority governments, this fragile alliance is regularly tested by motions of censure against the Commission. Whenever this occurs, von der Leyen and the EPP must renegotiate with a large part of S&D and Renew to keep them on side. And, once the radical-left and radical-right have discovered this tool and have the numbers to use it, more motions of censure can be expected in the future.
“The fragile alliance is regularly tested by motions of censure against the Commission”
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the EPP can now seek alternative majorities. At first, a possible majority formed by the EPP and the three right-wing groups — the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), with a national-conservative profile; Patriots for Europe (PfE), a right-wing populist group; and the most extreme, Europe of the Sovereign Nations (ESN) — was regarded merely as a technical possibility.However, it has already become a common option.
The majority led by the EPP together with the radical-right was first tested in symbolic votes, such as a resolution on Venezuela, since known as the “Venezuela majority.” That experience laid the groundwork for a majority to simplify Europe’s sustainability rules, postpone and then soften the EU’s deforestation regulations and, more recently, push changes in EU migration rules, such as the criteria and the definition of “safe third countries,” as well as the creation of “return centers” outside the Union.
Although the EPP insists that it does not formally cooperate with the three radical-right groups, this dynamic is increasingly common in core elements of the European agenda. Meanwhile, the partners of the “Von der Leyen Platform,” S&D and part of Renew, often find themselves in the minority. In migration dossiers, for example, during this term the EPP has voted more with ECR and PfE than with S&D or Renew.
“The majority led by the EPP together with the radical-right was first tested in symbolic votes, such as a resolution on Venezuela”
Finally, the third hallmark of this EPP tendency to behave like a minority-government is that it can be defeated, especially when the center-right fractures. The most notable example is the decision to refer — and thus attempt to delay or even block — the EU-Mercosur trade agreement to the Court of Justice of the European Union in January 2026.
In this case, the vote responded to a “horseshoe majority” formed by the radical left, the Greens and the radical right, with some rebels from the center-left and center-right. This was also possible due to the vote against the party line by Polish and French EPP members.
A Risky Strategy for the EPP and for the EU
These minority-government–style tendencies are changing the nature of European politics.
In the short term, they place the EPP in a strong position as a decisive actor. But the EPP also takes a risk: it will have to rely on the “Von der Leyen Platform” for big European decisions and for the budget. If the EPP votes too frequently alongside the radical right, the loose external-support deal will begin to crack.
In the long run, the EPP also risks legitimizing a radical right that remains, for the most part, eurosceptic and undemocratic.
“In the Mercosur stalemate, the vote responded to a ‘horseshoe majority’ formed by the radical left, the Greens and the radical right”
For the EU as a whole, the risks are even greater. With an ever more minority-government-like structure, the EP has become far less predictable. In future legislation, the Commission will have to navigate among several potential majorities without knowing which will prevail on voting day.
This not only means that the institutions will have to cooperate more with one another. It also complicates how initiatives are designed and negotiated. It could even derail or significantly alter central parts of the European agenda.
Therefore, the EP now resembles a national parliament much more when constrained by a minority government. Pushing the EU’s agenda will require much more time, political energy, and effort, with the EPP clearly at the helm and balancing a risky strategy: alternating between the conventional pro-European center and the lure of the radical right.
© Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels (Belgium) 2026
