From the outset, we must distinguish the political realities of Hungary and Italy. The former descends from a past subjected to the Soviet system, but with a strong tradition of struggle for its independence, both in the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and under Moscow’s yoke. The peculiarities of the Hungarian language, of its culture and of its history make them a people of Eastern Europe with a rebellious and nonconformist character.
The Italian political reality is conditioned by a history that ranges from the implementation of the first fascist experiment before World War II to a gray system, dominated for decades by Christian Democracy. An even grayer system, if you will, maintained as a brake to a possible advance of communism, until the eruption of the Tangentópolis scandal, which in the nineties wiped out the two parties that, since the fall of Mussolini, had shared power: the Socialist Party and Christian Democracy itself.
Starting from this base, we encounter two European leaders who also emerge from different realities. Viktor Orbán makes his debut in 1989 as a young leader with a historic anti-communist speech and, from the early days of democracy, he has been affiliated with liberal-leaning parties. Elected prime minister for the first time in 2010, his government was a classic European center-right, but that is to say, it was obstructed every other day by the European Commission, which demanded more economic reforms.
Here it is worth noting that the European Commission has a long-standing and proven habit of forcing center-right governments to carry out reforms, only to, whether by chance or not, dampen that same momentum when dealing with a left-wing government. Without intending to ideologize the matter, it seems the Commission has a very clear idea of which governments can spend and which must save when it issues its opinions on the matter.
“It seems that the Commission has a very clear idea of which governments can spend and which should save when it issues its opinions on the matter”
Other leaders of the European People’s Party, having passed through this double standard, did not write a greater story about this peculiar tradition, but not Viktor. I witnessed the transformation of a PPE leader, its vice-president, into something within the political family that we initially referred to, with sympathy, as the enfant terrible. The scourge of the European institutions emerged and the subsequent leader of euro-scepticism, preaching a return to the EU’s origins, the restoration of powers to the member states, and becoming the model to follow for later far-right European leaders.
Giorgia Meloni is the product of the transformation of the Italian far right during the nineties into a right that was more acceptable at the European level, thanks to the strategic intelligence of Gianfranco Fini and the collaboration of Silvio Berlusconi, who sought to attract these voters to the center-right in various coalitions led by Forza Italia. In fact, Meloni was a minister in one of Berlusconi’s governments.
But she had the vision and the courage to subsequently form her own party, Fratelli d’Italia. Initially, it gathered the scant electoral harvest of Fini’s former Alleanza Nazionale, being the only one not to support Mario Draghi’s technocratic government and becoming, after the decline in Forza Italia’s electoral results, the reference for any voter on the right of the country.
It is very difficult for a Spanish mindset to understand the swings of Italian politics, but one principle suffices: they are not red or blue, nor Real Madrid or FC Barcelona; they will never let themselves be pigeonholed into extreme positions nor resort to a civil war to settle ideological differences. And if they assume ideological extremes, they will do so temporarily and seeking any tactical advantage that the moment requires.
Therefore, and from this vantage point, it is easy to understand the changes carried out on the Italian right, which were not predicted by European and Spanish press. At first, the media attacked the Meloni phenomenon, only to later, with time, discover the new leader of the European right, with an international influence not seen since Angela Merkel.
Meloni has managed to bring together around her the best of all trends and families of the Italian right. The foremost exemplar of this thesis is her collaboration with Antonio Tajani, Minister of Foreign Affairs, political right-hand man of Silvio Berlusconi for years and a fundamental figure in Italian European politics over the last two decades, having served as President of the European Parliament and Vice-President of the European Commission.
The close collaboration of the Meloni-Tajani duo is, in my view, the origin of the leadership that Italy is taking on the European Council, albeit without publicity or grand fireworks, but with firm resolve and thanks to the absence of the historic leadership of France and Germany.
“The close collaboration of the Meloni-Tajani duo is, in my view, the origin of the leadership that Italy is assuming in the European Council”
If I had to choose, as the title of this article asks us, between the two leaderships, I find Meloni more attractive, perhaps due to our Mediterranean affinity. Less noisy and certainly less divisive, she respects European commitments while defending her principles and values, many of which I share. And those I do not share, at least I know I can debate and reach consensus with the Italians.
Let the Spanish media be a little more Mediterranean and understand that Meloni is not the vampire of Italian and European far-right, but a very pragmatic Italian politician, who even attracts votes from the Italian left (which is not very difficult, given how the left is faring in that country) and has plenty of run left.
The big question I have is whether she will continue the Trumpist agenda of trying to divide European partners in the months to come or whether she will be part of the European leadership that negotiates united against the hurricane looming from Washington.
To be watched with interest, for it is well known in Brussels that, without the Italian’s input, the Council does not move.
