The Integration Index
Analyses of the situation in various countries structure the publication of policies on migrant integration around eight fundamental factors, develop subfactors, and finally define concrete indicators. All the indicators are distilled into an integration index.
With the 167 indicators an overall integration index is calculated. The Table 1 presents the index of migrant population integration policies across different nations. I present it here for 2010 and 2014, dates that are comparable. This index covers 38 countries, mainly European, and also includes Turkey, Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan. It consists of 167 indicators for each country, arranged into eight factors, each factor subdivided into four “dimensions” that group indicators, and their scores are ultimately aggregated into a single index.
The countries are ordered according to a modern version of the index called the Migrant Integration Policy Index IV. The list does not follow an obvious order, nor does it necessarily correlate with economic development. Portugal tops the ranking, followed by Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Finland, which is to be expected. Australia and New Zealand also rank high. Canada appears in 5th place and the United States in 10th. Spain’s position is relatively favorable, occupying the twelfth place. Behind Spain would be Italy (15th), the United Kingdom (16th), and France in 18th. Countries with the lowest scores (less than forty points on the index) are Malta, Lithuania, Slovakia, Cyprus, Latvia, and Turkey. The latter ranks 38th with a score of twenty-four. The integration index varies from twenty-four (Turkey) to eighty (Portugal and Sweden). In this context, Spain’s score of 61 on the index represents 76% of the maximum and places it in the first third of the set of countries.
At a glance, this integration index appears fairly stable. Fourteen countries show improvements—albeit modest—while only six deteriorate. Spain remains at 61 on both dates. Across the European Union as a whole, the average score is 52 and does not vary. Yet there is room for improvement, because an average of 52 is quite low compared with the practical maximum of 80. It is important to see in which areas progress is possible. But each country is different.
The Possible Improvements for Spain’s Integration
In the Table 2 I present the eight factors of the integration index for Spain. They are ordered from highest to lowest score to make visible the successes and failures of immigration policies. I include the score of each factor, as well as the rank relative to the total of 38 countries in the sample. It is striking that Spain leads the list in the family reunification factor, scoring ninety out of a possible hundred. It is also very strong in granting permanent residence to immigrants, with a score of 74, ranking third best on the list. The two columns do not align in their overall ranking. In political participation, Spain performs worse than expected, ranking 15th. In anti-discrimination the scores are not good: 49 on the index, and 29th place. Yet, without a doubt, the poorest performing factor in Spain’s migrant integration policies is education.
Spain hardly shifts its immigrant integration patterns. With progressive governments there is improvement in political participation; with conservative governments, declines occur. Integration tends to be easier for migrants originating from countries sharing a common Spanish-speaking culture. The economic crisis, the ensuing austerity, and then the Covid-19 pandemic have made it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of integration policies. Naturalization procedures are overly bureaucratic and slow. There are disparities in access to naturalization that depend on the migrants’ country of origin and lead to unfair differences.
“The hypothesis of Spanish exceptionalism holds that until recently, in Spain there were no attitudes or organized social movements of xenophobic, racist, or nativist character”
The hypothesis of Spanish exceptionalism posits that—unlike other European countries and despite by the immigration experienced since the 21st century—until recently, in Spain there were no attitudes or organized social movements (of xenophobic, racist, or nativist nature) (all three are forms of intolerance). Thus, it is claimed that: “Spain and Portugal have stood out among the few countries that have shown immunity to the xenophobic populist virus” (Joaquín Arango, 2015). This is relatively true, but only up to 2019.
Meanwhile, hate crimes are growing in Spain, according to data from the Ministry of the Interior. In 2019 there were about 1,706 cases, an increase of 7% compared with the previous year. Catalonia is the autonomous community with the most hate speech cases, although many cases go unreported compared with those that actually occur. These incidents include xenophobia, racism, anti-Gypsyism, rejection based on sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as hostility toward people with disabilities, toward the poor (often called aporophobia), antisemitism, racist violence, and other cases. The perpetrators are predominantly male (83%), and 85% are “Spanish.”
The Handling of Terminology
“Xenophobia” literally means rejection of a foreign person. It encompasses attitudes, prejudices, or behaviors that reject and exclude others based on their foreign origin. “Racism” occurs when a group is deemed superior. Sometimes it is referred to as “supremacism” (white). They feed on fear and hatred of foreigners, coupled with a desire to preserve one’s own national or ethnic identity. They promote the exaltation of their own culture. “Nativism” adds that in a country only natives should be part of the citizenry as a first-class group; those who come from outside are seen as a threat. Immigration is criminalized (especially Muslim), border closures are advocated, as well as the deportation of immigrants deemed problematic. A concrete form is Islamophobia, or rejection of Muslims, as well as of their language, culture, and religion. It is typically combined with hatred toward certain minorities and nationalities (or ethnic groups). All these concepts are interconnected and frequently combined with populism.
“In Spain, Muslims are viewed negatively by 42% of the population, though in some countries the percentage is even higher”
In Spain, Muslims are viewed negatively by 42% of the population. There are countries where that percentage is even higher, such as Italy with 55% and Poland with 66%. Significantly, these are largely Christian-Catholic countries. Other countries reduce this share of negative opinions more substantially: Sweden 28%, Germany 24%, France 22%, and the United Kingdom 18% are some examples. But the essential difference lies in whether there exists a political party openly xenophobic, racist, or nativist.
In that sense, the fact that many migrants in Spain find themselves in an irregular situation matters. Many work in the informal economy. Others are people “without papers”. These situations are often addressed through periodic extraordinary regularizations.
Xenophobia and Immigration in Spain
For the debate on xenophobia toward migrants in Spain, I recommend reading the excellent sociological studies by M. Ángeles Cea D’Ancona, and Miguel S. Valles Martínez (sometimes with Cecilia Eseverri). Surveys do not ask the population directly, “Are you racist? Very, quite, little, or not at all,” or “Are you xenophobic? Very, quite, little, or not at all.” Indirect questions are used, which do not imply immediate identification but do indicate a tendency to reject migrants.
For example, people are asked whether they think immigration laws are too tolerant; whether they support welcoming political exiles without restrictions; or whether they believe the number of immigrants is too high. They are also asked whether these people receive more than they contribute. Regarding employment, questions can also vary: whether the presence of immigrants lowers wages; whether they take jobs; and whether it is better to hire someone who is Spanish first.
They are also asked whether immigrants should be allowed to bring their families, vote in municipal elections, or even in general elections, and whether they should have the right to obtain Spanish citizenship. About Muslims there are specific questions such as whether female students wearing a veil should be excluded from schools; whether one would protest the construction of mosques; and whether that migrant community should retain only those aspects of its culture and religion that do not cause discomfort (sic). They are also asked whether they agree with immigration that is willing to adopt “the country’s way of life” (sic).
With these indicators it is possible to gauge opinions about immigrants. Although one level of analysis concerns attitudes and another concerns behavior. The reality that matters is whether a person objects to having neighbors who are immigrants, whether they live with an immigrant, marry one, or accept that their children marry immigrants. One can hold stereotypical racist views and yet still interact with immigrants.
The studies (by Cea and Valles) note that explicit rejection of immigration declined from 1993 to 1996. Beginning in 2000, rejection rose, peaking at the end of the economic crisis (around 2011). Rejection goes from 8% to 40%. The Spanish population believes there are too many immigrants, and that proportion gradually rises from 34% in 1996 to 82% in 2010.
“81% of Spaniards believe that the existence of immigrants lowers wages, and 69% favor hiring a Spanish person first”
The rejection of migrants runs parallel to the belief that there are too many. From 2000 the population is less supportive of granting rights to foreigners. The 81% think that the existence of immigrants lowers wages, 69% favor hiring Spaniards first, and 64% believe immigrants take jobs away from Spaniards. But positively, 73% acknowledge that these people fill necessary jobs. There are contradictions, which is normal in surveys. On the other hand, 63% of those surveyed believe that immigrants receive more than they contribute. Regarding Muslims, attitudes can be clear. 51% of Spaniards think that the Muslim population should preserve only those aspects of their culture and religion that do not cause annoyance; 47% think one should protest the construction of mosques; and even 41% of Spaniards think that female students with veils should be excluded.
Opiniones españolas sobre el burka, matrimonios concertados—especialmente con menores—, y la ablación del clítoris son negativas. El rechazo es alto, pero, al mismo tiempo, el 83% de la población española considera que la comunidad inmigrante debe tener derecho a traer a sus familiares. También gobiernan mayoritariamente los que defienden que los migrantes deben poder obtener la nacionalidad (el 79%). El 73% opina que pueden votar en las elecciones municipales, e incluso el 65% en las generales.
A nivel comparativo, España es el tercer país de la Unión Europea más favorable a la inmigración laboral, solo por detrás de Suecia (el país menos xenófobo) y Finlandia.
The Challenge of Migrating Across the Mediterranean
We can speak of a “marine cemetery.” Mediterranean sea migration is the deadliest route in the world. This sea is the place where more migrants die—or disappear forever—without a trace. That is why it surprises me that in Spain, scholarship on migrations has barely analyzed sea migration, whether via Mediterranean routes, mainly through the Strait and the Alboran Sea, or the Atlantic route toward the Canary Islands. This is a topic typically left to newspapers or television. In reality, it involves a steady stream of events, sometimes macabre.
It is true that data are incomplete, varied, difficult to collect and analyze. But there are the works and studies of the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The navigation of “pateras” (and all kinds of vessels) from Africa to the Iberian Peninsula and to the Canary Islands is a sociologically important and dramatic reality. The crew and passengers are not only from North Africa; there is also transit migration from Africa toward the north and west that then moves to Spain. Most are young men, but there are also women, pregnant women, and minors. The prevailing mood is desperation and suffering.
In the Table 3 I present data on arrivals of migrants in illegal boats to the Spanish coasts, including the Balearic and Canary Islands. In 2019, just over 26,000 migrants arrived by sea to Spain, representing 4% of the foreign population that year (both legal and illegal).
“Migration by boats continues to arrive predominantly through the Strait of Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea”
The two provinces with the most cases of clandestine disembarkation are Almería, with 6,461 cases, and Cádiz, with 5,404. In other words, maritime migration remains primarily through the Strait of Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea. Four provinces account for 74% of arrivals: Almería, Granada, Málaga, and Cádiz, from north to south. The Balearic Islands receive few arrivals (357 in a year), especially when compared with the Canary Islands, which are drawing new boats with migrants up to 2,680 arrivals annually.
Around Spain arrivals come from a wide range of African countries, but two predominate: Morocco 28% and Algeria 16%. Other important origins are the Republic of Guinea (Guinea-Conakry), Mali, Ivory Coast, and Senegal.
The majority of arrivals remain from Morocco, with 7,368 migrants. But Algerian migration to Spain has grown substantially, totaling 4,102. Naturally, the routes differ. Moroccans (primarily men, though not exclusively) head toward Huelva and Cádiz, but also toward the autonomous city of Ceuta and increasingly toward Las Palmas (Gran Canaria). Algerian migrants tend to head for Murcia and Alicante, as well as the Balearic Islands.
“The fluctuations in migrants and routes mark the flexibility of this migration, which adapts to controls, surveillance, and available means”
Overall, young men predominate among those migrating by sea to the Spanish coasts; they account for 89%. Women thus represent about one in ten migrants (some of them pregnant). Minors make up 12% of the total and are mostly male (only 8% of arriving minors are girls). With 2019 data, there is a notable decrease in boats. Arrivals by sea are less than half of the previous year’s total, which stood at 56,145 migrants. The fluctuations of migrants and routes mark the flexibility of this migration, which adapts to controls, surveillance, and available resources. Although the distances traveled are often greater.
The crossing by sea is not excessively large, but it is complex, difficult, and deadly. For example, in 2019 around 665,000 foreigners entered Spain. Of that total, about 4% did so illegally by sea—either across the Mediterranean or along the Atlantic coast toward the Canary Islands. They account for at least 26,168 people. Yet mortality remains terrible. In the last six years—based on United Nations data—more than 20,000 migrants have died or disappeared trying to cross the Mediterranean.
Shipwrecks and Mortality on Migration Routes
The year 2015 was particularly deadly. On 18 April, a vessel carrying around 900 people sinks in the Strait of Sicily, with only twenty-eight survivors. Two years earlier, on 3 October 2013 near the island of Lampedusa, a boat carrying 368 migrants sinks, with only 155 survivors. Just months earlier, on 18 April 2013, a vessel departed from Libya toward Italy with about 500 migrants: all lost.
On 26 November 2019, a vessel carrying 73 passengers en route to Spain disappeared in the Alboran Sea. Around the same time, seven boats from Libya disappeared, with no survivors located.
In the Atlantic route toward the Canary Islands in 2019, at least 170 people died. Many other boats disappeared. These are known as “ghost boats.” The most dangerous route remains the Africa-to-Italy corridor. Despite these risks, in the last six years Europe sees more than one hundred thousand migrants arriving by sea each year.
Finally, there is a third route, from Turkey by sea to the Greek islands. In reality, it is a longer route: first by land from Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria to Turkey, and from there by sea to Greece. The most common route runs from Somalia and Eritrea to Libya, and from Libya by sea to Italy. The other western route typically ends in Spain, coming from Morocco, Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, and Mali. Now there is also origin from Algeria.
Different Routes, Differential Risks
I recommend consulting Human Rights Watch’s report, titled The Mediterranean Migrant Crisis: Why People Flee, What the European Union Should Do. HRW emphasizes that there are two types of migration: people who flee from countries where human rights are violated, where life is at risk, on the one hand. On the other hand, there is labor migration: individuals from poor African countries who set out in search of work in Europe. Often both groups overlap.
The countries with the highest number of people fleeing due to human rights violations are Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Libya. We are talking about desperate migration. Even many minors travel alone, without guardians. Generally, they are boys between 14 and 17 years old, though some are younger. For example, on 19 April 2015 a Libyan departure vessel sank, killing 800 people, 100 of whom were minors. A few months earlier (in September 2014) 500 migrants died on the coasts of Malta, including about a hundred children.
“There are programs that attempt to mitigate the problems of this migration, such as Mare Nostrum, originally an Italian program, and the EU’s Operation Triton, which responds to SOS calls in the Mediterranean but does not actively search for them”
There are programs that try to mitigate the problems of this migration—the deadliest in the world—such as Mare Nostrum (originating in Italy), or the European Union’s Operation Triton, which responds to SOS calls from boats at sea in the Mediterranean, though it does not actively seek them out. Three types of people migrating are identified here: the two previously mentioned—asylum-seekers or refugees and labor migrants—and the third, trafficking in human beings. Primarily, the aim of the programs is to prevent embarkations, thereby limiting arrivals to Europe. They also seek to avoid the most dangerous routes. Previously, ships were intercepted and returned to their starting place—often Libya. But that could be even more dangerous for these migrant communities. Therefore, the current objective is to disembark them in a safe territory: a European Union port.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is a United Nations agency. Among its goals is to contribute to safer and more orderly migration in the Mediterranean—from the southern shore to the northern shore—reducing deaths and alleviating the suffering of the migrant population. It is estimated, for example, that between 2014 and 2019 more than 20,000 migrants die—or disappear—while trying to cross the Mediterranean. Four decades ago there were no deaths at all. The absolute number of deaths has declined somewhat in recent years, but the mortality rate remains far too high. Knowing the exact number of fatalities is not as important; it is often said that “one death is already too many.”
The risks faced by the migrant group along the journey increase. Mortality in the Spanish region—the western Mediterranean, and toward the Canary Islands—is a fundamental reality within the European framework. It accounts for 35% of all deaths (and disappearances) in this space in 2018, and 29% in 2019.
There is no precise count of shipwrecks, deaths at sea, or missing persons. Nor is there a precise count of how many migrants reach European shores alive, although controls are increasing. But the number of boats leaving Africa is the most uncertain figure. Both numbers must be accounted for: those who arrive alive and those who depart; because many boats are intercepted when arriving in Europe, and others even depart from northern and western Africa.
These migrants are not necessarily from North African countries. The coastal states are often transit zones for Sub-Saharan migrants. For example, Canary Islands arrivals come from a cluster of countries in the western African region, including Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, the two Guineas, Sierra Leone, and even Mali. Some vessels in these routes reach their destination with a large portion of passengers; it is difficult to determine the original number of people who began the journey. The mortality is estimated at 4.8% (one death for every twenty people), but if calculated on those who arrive alive it can rise to 7.8%.
“The voyage across the Mediterranean, and especially across the Atlantic, is dangerous. Many passengers die without leaving a trace on invisible shipwrecks, and their bodies are not recovered”
Some basic data appear in the report Calculating “Death Rates” in the Context of Migration Journeys: Focus on the Central Mediterranean, by the International Organization for Migration, prepared by the Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, which is accessible online. The Mediterranean crossing, and especially the Atlantic crossing toward the Canaries, is dangerous. Many passengers die without leaving a trace on invisible shipwrecks, their bodies not recovered. In many cases the number of those who drown is based on other survivors’ accounts, which are not exact and cannot be verified. The routes are flexible and change often, also depending on the jurisdictions of different countries, which complicates control and rescue. Sometimes the statistics refer to the same migrants who fail to reach Europe and try again. Other migrants embark without really knowing the destination.
Thus, the mortality rates for those who arrive differ from those of those who originally embarked, and these numbers drive the overall death or disappearance rates (usually drowning, but also due to cold or hunger). Many migrants are desperate and willing to take high risks that sometimes end in death.
In the Table 4 I present data from the Global Migration Analysis Centre report. It shows the evolution in the 2015–2019 period for which somewhat more reliable data exist. Three global routes are distinguished— or migration journeys as the report calls them—: Western, Central, and Eastern. All three refer to the Mediterranean. I compute the migrant mortality rate here per thousand cases. The greatest problem lies in the Central region, where mortality reaches about one dead for every twenty-one migrants (sic).
The data are also rough for the Atlantic route toward the Canaries. In reality, this is the most dangerous route due to the greater distance and adverse weather conditions. In the first seven months of 2020, 3,269 migrants arrived to the Canary Islands by sea, with at least 5% mortality. This makes the renewed migration to the Canary Islands five times more deadly than the Strait of Gibraltar and Alboran Sea routes, and more than double the mortality of the Central Mediterranean route toward Italy and Malta. IOM’s exact figures show 10% mortality on the Canary route, 1.6% on the Strait of Gibraltar and Alboran Sea route, 12% on the Central Mediterranean route, and 0.2% on the Eastern route. But it is emphasized that it is difficult to determine the number of people who die in the attempt because many ships disappear.
The crossing to the Canary Islands takes between ten and fifteen days of navigation, with obvious problems of fuel, water, and food. The trade winds (northeast) can further complicate the journey. There are many cases of hypothermia and dehydration, and the nights are extremely harsh. As one Alarm Phone representative notes: “If coordination between authorities of different states were used to save lives [humans] and not for the militarization of borders, the number of lives lost would be much smaller” (p. 13). That phrase “lives lost” is striking.
The Shifting of Routes Toward the Canary Islands
Boarding from Morocco is becoming increasingly difficult, but migrants are seeking other routes that are less monitored, though more violent and dangerous. As a result, sea arrivals decrease, but suffering rises. Embarkations now occur from Western Sahara, Senegal, Mauritania, and Gambia toward the Canary Islands. A new phenomenon is migration from Algeria toward the Balearic Islands, Almería, Alicante, and Murcia. Up to one in four arrivals in Spain originate from Algeria. Arrivals to the Balearic Islands or to Alicante have doubled. Arrivals to the Canary Islands have doubled or more, making this the most frequent route and also the deadliest.
“Moroccan control in Western Sahara pushes embarkation points southward, increasing the number of disappeared and invisible dead”
The control causes boats to relocate to more southern, remote sites with greater risk and higher potential mortality. In 2007 a boat carrying about 160 young people leaving Senegal disappears. This is an example of how a control measure intended to prevent departures can have even worse consequences.
Migrants are often assisted and provided information in Arabic, a language that many do not know. In Spain—including the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands—the arrival of boats carrying irregular migrants often necessitates housing them in cramped spaces due to a sudden surge exceeding reception facilities. Overcrowding is an additional problem.
Many Senegalese migrants aiming to traverse the Atlantic to reach the Canary Islands express their resolve as: Barça ou barzakh which translates to “Barcelona or death”. The Canary Islands have become the new migration route to Europe. In 2020 there were 529 migrants on boats who died, and more than four hundred officially reported missing. The actual number of fatalities is almost certainly higher. Despite the danger—significantly higher than crossing the Mediterranean—more than 18,000 migrants by sea reach the Canary Islands that year. The aim is to find work and remit money home, and if possible, to hop to the Iberian peninsula.
The scale of illegal migration to the Canary Islands makes them, as some locals say, an open-air prison; or a temporary detention center. Patrol boats attempt to stop the rafts, but international bodies discourage returning refugees to countries such as Mali, due to safety concerns. Greenpeace asserts that the European Union wants the fish from Senegal but not its migrants. The tightened control of canoes in the Mediterranean against illegal migrants has displaced routes toward the Canary Islands, intensifying deaths and suffering. It amounts to a sea journey of roughly 1,500 kilometers of extreme difficulty. The social problem is not solved; in fact, it worsens.
