Derick Irisha Brown, the focus of this dispute, is, frankly, not an appealing petitioner for Supreme Court review. Yet, beyond the horror of her alleged offenses—kidnapping a three-year-old who authorities say suffered sexual abuse and was “accidentally killed” by her partner—her case raises a question at the core of the constitutional boundary between state power and federal authority.
At the time of the proceedings, Brown faced capital murder charges under Alabama law, which could carry either the death penalty or a life sentence without the possibility of parole if she were found guilty. But in September 2024, a jury found her guilty on federal kidnapping charges, yielding two concurrent life terms. The government’s theory for federal jurisdiction rested on Brown’s use of a vehicle to abduct the child, a contention the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit treated as sufficient, by itself, to establish nationwide authority under the Commerce Clause.
Brown’s petition to the Supreme Court highlights the sweeping consequences of interpreting the power to “regulate commerce…among the several states” as a broad license to reach “any conduct involving an automobile.” Could the Commerce Clause “give Congress the power to ban double parking?” her counsel asks. “A failure to signal a turn? Driving with an expired license? In the Eleventh Circuit, apparently, it could.”
The Supreme Court has explained that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to “regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.” The statute under which Brown was convicted, 18 U.S.C. 1201, leans on that principle: it targets a kidnapper who “uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the offense.”
Last December, when the Eleventh Circuit rejected Brown’s constitutional challenge to her federal indictment, the court cited its earlier decision in United States v. Bryan, which held that automobiles are “per se” instrumentalities of interstate commerce. That view aligns with rulings from the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, but it runs counter to the Tenth Circuit’s 2025 ruling in United States v. Chavarria.
“Permitting the government to prosecute based on the use of any ordinary motor vehicle (here, a Jeep) to commit a purely intrastate crime would transform any crime involving a vehicle into a federal matter,” the Tenth Circuit observed. “That reading—unmoored from a principled limitation—pushes Congress’s authority beyond the constitutional boundaries.”
If the Eleventh Circuit’s contrary view is correct, the petition argues, “Congress would possess power under the Commerce Clause to regulate virtually anything tied to an automobile.” Brown v. United States, petition contends, “Congress could enact nationwide parking and traffic rules. Congress could fashion a federal contract regime governing the purchase and leasing of cars, and a federal tort regime governing automobile collisions. Congress could convert any state crime into a federal offense if any participant traveled to or from the scene. Congress would gain a ‘police power’ over all facets of American life that involve automobiles.”
The Cato Institute adds its voice in a concise brief urging the Court to hear Brown’s case. The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, the institute argues, edges the Commerce Clause toward becoming the engine of a general federal police power—an authority that the Framers intentionally withheld from the national government. Such a shift would undercut the essential division of power between national and state governments on which federalism rests and would threaten the Constitution’s structural guarantees by enabling Congress to regulate many new aspects of daily life.
According to the Cato brief, the Commerce Clause has already been stretched beyond its original meaning. “Commerce” was historically understood as trade—nothing more, nothing less—an interpretation supported by contemporaneous dictionaries, James Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention, The Federalist Papers, addresses at state ratifying conventions, and early judicial decisions. That traditional view framed commerce as the exchange of goods, setting it apart from productive activities like manufacturing and agriculture.
The Cato brief also argues that the qualifying phrase “among the several states” originally referred to activity “among people of different states.” Consequently, the clause does not cover “commerce that occurs entirely within one state.” Its regulatory reach, Berry and colleagues explain, is limited not only to trade, but to trade that crosses state borders; activity wholly contained within a single state—even if characterized as commercial—falls outside the federal realm.
Because Brown’s conduct did not involve trade and was not interstate in nature, that factor should, the brief contends, settle whether a federal statute grounded in the Commerce Clause can reach it. And even if one accepts that the instrumentalities of interstate commerce may include vehicles, merely placing automobiles in that category would carry dangerous consequences.
Unlike airplanes, shipping containers, railways, or telegraphs—each of which the Supreme Court has once treated as instrumentalities of interstate commerce—cars are not primarily used for interstate business. “Automobiles are routinely employed in activities far outside interstate commerce,” the brief notes. “A typical U.S. driving trip lasts about twenty-five minutes, with an average daily mileage of roughly 29 miles. Those figures are far below even the length of the smallest state.” It is not just common sense but an established fact that many car trips bear no relation to commerce at all.
This distinction is central to the case: Brown’s vehicle did not depart Alabama, did not cross state lines, and was not employed for commerce. The authors state that a car trip that is neither interstate nor commercial cannot qualify as interstate commerce, and because cars are not predominantly used for trips that are both commercial and interstate, they cannot be deemed per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
To hold otherwise would empower Congress to regulate an extensive array of conduct lacking any link to interstate commerce. Should the Eleventh Circuit prevail, the result would massively widen federal power to regulate ordinary matters such as traffic rules and driver licensing that historically have fallen under state control.
The Cato brief draws heavily on the work of Georgetown University law professor Randy Barnett, who filed a separate brief with analogous points. The Eleventh Circuit’s logic “permits Congress to regulate the purely intrastate use of an automobile—untethered to any economic activity,” Barnett writes. “That logic has no rational stopping point. If an automobile is always an instrumentality, then Congress could regulate nearly any activity that involves a car.” Accordingly, Congress could impose local speed limits, set licensing standards for local drivers, govern the duration and handling of school drop-off lines, or dictate how residential streets must be plowed after snowfall.
The per se rule advanced by the Eleventh Circuit would turn a common, locally used object into a universal jurisdictional hook. Barnett warns that this would not reflect a faithful implementation of the Commerce power; rather, it would be an end-run around its limits.