Like many other federal courts addressing similar challenges, this ruling holds that sanctuary jurisdictions are safeguarded by the Tenth Amendment.
Yesterday, in United States v. City of New York, another federal court sided against the Trump administration in a sanctuary-city dispute. In this matter, Judge Reyes of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York upheld New York City’s statutes that limit local law-enforcement information sharing and other forms of cooperation with federal immigration authorities. The court concluded that federal law does not preempt these policies, and that even if it did, there would be a violation of the anti-commandeering principle embedded in the Tenth Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X.
The United States contends that its aim is not to compel participation in immigration enforcement but to remove the defendants’ explicit and implicit obstacles to the Executive’s duty to perform immigration enforcement. New York City replies that accepting the United States’ argument would require the City to actively assist the federal government in enforcing immigration laws, thereby violating the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering doctrine.
New York City’s position is correct, at least in part. The United States seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to preempt the challenged provisions. If those provisions were struck down, the City would not be obligated to carry out federal immigration enforcement; yet the City would still be barred from prohibiting its agencies and employees from using personnel, property, and other resources to detain individuals and to enable inter-agency information-sharing, including disclosing personally identifiable information, all potentially in conflict with state law. Moreover, there is no federal obligation requiring states to participate in federal immigration enforcement or to comply with it.
The United States’ preemption argument amounts to little more than a workaround of the Tenth Amendment, resting on a flawed distinction between (a) compelling local participation in federal immigration enforcement and (b) forbidding local governments from directing how their personnel and resources may be used for federal enforcement purposes. The court reaffirmed a basic principle: Congress cannot issue direct commands to state legislatures, including mandates for affirmative action or prohibitions against certain actions. This principle is central to the anti-commandeering doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Murphy v. NCAA. If states are not free to manage their own agencies and staff in resisting federal immigration enforcement—an entitlement within the states’ constitutional prerogatives—the protection afforded by the Tenth Amendment would be hollow.
This ruling, like many others that safeguard sanctuary jurisdictions, leans heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2018 anti-commandeering decision in Murphy v. NCAA, authored by Justice Samuel Alito and supported by the Court’s then-conservative majority. The decision underscores that Congress cannot dictate the actions of state and local legislatures, whether through affirmative orders or prohibitions that would affect state-law policy choices.
Judge Reyes also rejects the administration’s reliance on the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, which generally bars states and municipalities from directly regulating federal agencies or discriminating against them. In a line of decisions, including United States v. New Jersey, the court stressed that there can be no discrimination unless a comparable activity within sanctuary policies receives more favorable treatment. The court noted that a true comparator is essential; without one, the United States’ discrimination claim collapses. The United States does not and cannot identify a similarly situated entity—state and local agencies and their officers do not enforce immigration law, nor do members of the public. As the government itself concedes, the federal government holds the exclusive responsibility for enforcing immigration law. Because other federal agencies have different missions and circumstances, for a state law to unlawfully discriminate against the federal government, it must treat comparable classes of federal and non-federal employees differently, not merely different classes of federal employees.
In this regard, the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity’s anti-discrimination element is itself controversial, and some observers have questioned whether it should endure. Nevertheless, Judge Reyes’s ruling stands for the proposition that sanctuary policies are not inherently discriminatory against federal authorities merely by virtue of setting distinct rules for how local actors engage with immigration enforcement.
This decision adds to a substantial line of unfavorable outcomes for the administration in sanctuary-city cases, spanning both the first and second administrations. The judge cites roughly a dozen similar decisions from the past year alone. A broader survey of this jurisprudence has been presented in recent discussions noting that, when the administration attempts to coerce states and localities into participating in immigration enforcement, courts have consistently found this inconsistent with established anti-commandeering principles. Similarly, when the administration attempts to condition federal funding on sanctuary-like cooperation, courts have generally held that the executive branch cannot impose conditions on federal grants that Congress has not authorized and, in some instances, that such conditions are unconstitutionally coercive.
The current ruling may be subject to appeal. If appealed, however, there is reason to believe it would likely withstand scrutiny. While the administration has occasionally secured limited victories in sanctuary contexts when facts are unusual, such instances are exceptional. Moreover, as noted previously, decisions under the Contracts Clause—though they have attracted attention—do not materially undermine the protections afforded sanctuary jurisdictions, and the overall trajectory remains unfavorable for the federal government in these cases. In sum, the trend shows substantial judicial resistance to attempts to coerce sanctuary cities into aiding federal immigration enforcement.
