On April 2, 2025, the White House announced an additional 10% tariff on all countries and higher reciprocal tariffs for nations with whom the United States ran larger trade deficits. The new tariff offensive promised to correct deficits, protect the domestic industry and reduce external dependency. However, the recent evolution of imports and exports shows that tariffs have real effects, but within a more complex economic context. The United States economy has continued to grow, invest, spend and demand goods that, in many cases, can only be obtained through global supply chains in other countries.
“The answer requires distinguishing between the specific effect of trade policy and the broader effect of economic activity”
Today we ask how much tariffs have actually influenced the United States’ commercial behavior and why, despite them, imports resume growth at certain moments. The answer requires distinguishing between the specific effect of trade policy and the broader effect of economic activity.
Before Trump’s tariff policy came into force, many firms ran ahead and increased imports to avoid future costs. U.S. imports of goods rose from $323.8 billion in January 2025 to $340.1 billion in March. In April, already with the tariffs in effect, they fell to $274.7 billion. The March-to-April drop was close to 19%. We were facing a pattern of anticipation and adjustment.
This first move confirms that tariffs have real effects. They change relative prices, alter purchase calendars, modify inventories and push firms to seek alternative suppliers. Moreover, when a firm does not know whether a product will be more expensive in two months, it has incentives to front-load orders, accumulate stock or redesign contracts.
“A country can impose tariffs and, at the same time, continue importing a lot if households consume, firms invest and strategic sectors urgently need foreign components”
But the deficit does not depend solely on tariffs. Internal demand, saving and investment, the exchange rate, relative competitiveness, the structure of production and, of course, the United States’ position in global value chains also intervene. A country can impose tariffs and, at the same time, continue importing a lot if households consume, firms invest and strategic sectors urgently need foreign components.
That is precisely what the latest data suggest. In May 2026, the goods and services deficit for the United States rose to $77.6 billion, up from $54.6 billion in April. In other words, it grew 42.2% month-on-month and reached its highest level since March 2025. Imports rose 3.3%, to $395.3 billion, while exports fell 3.2%, to $317.7 billion. The goods deficit rose to $106.5 billion, although the services surplus improved slightly.
The accumulated deficit from January to May 2026 was 40.6% lower than in the same period of 2025, but that comparison is conditioned by the extraordinary pre-tariff import buildup in the previous year. In other words, part of the year-on-year improvement reflects that 2025 was an anomalous year, and not that tariffs have structurally corrected the external imbalance.
The May uptick also reflects the dependence of the U.S. economy on foreign goods to sustain its own investment cycle. Reuters noted that in May 2026 capital goods imports reached a record $128.0 billion, driven by computer accessories, semiconductors, aircraft, generators and industrial engines. Investment in artificial intelligence appears as one of the major explanatory factors due to the construction of data centers, the upgrading of equipment and the technological infrastructure that require importing sophisticated components.
“The May jump has been a combination of technological investment, domestic demand, inventory rebalancing, supply tensions and the relative weakness of exports”
Artificial intelligence explains a large part of the record capital goods imports and the pull of semiconductors and computer accessories, but the increase in the deficit was broader. Imports of industrial materials, vehicles and consumer goods also grew, while exports fell back! Therefore, the May jump has been a combination of technological investment, domestic demand, inventory rebalancing, supply tensions and the relative weakness of exports.
Trade statistics are typically expressed in nominal value, so we must also take prices into account. If the price of imported goods rises, the total value can increase even if the physical volume does not change proportionally. This is relevant because a purely accounting reading can overestimate the true strength of trade flows or, on the contrary, underestimate the cost borne by consumers and businesses. In other words, part of the effect of a tariff is not observed as a smaller imported volume, but as a higher cost for those still needing to import.
Prices have a direct impact on the imports of some products: they become more expensive and demand falls or shifts. Secondly, prices create a temporary impact: firms front-load purchases, accumulate inventories and then reduce orders. The third impact is relocation from China or other origins to Mexico, Vietnam, Taiwan, the European Union or other partners, without the aggregate deficit disappearing. Tariff policy can change the map of trade without reducing its total size.
The impact of tariffs on the U.S. economy is notable. Although Trump’s aim was to reduce external dependence and correct trade imbalances, tariffs raise the cost of imports used by American households and businesses. Moreover, the final effect depends on two uncertain factors: firms’ ability to substitute suppliers and the effective duration of measures subject to legal, temporary and sectoral changes. Yale’s Budget Lab placed the average effective tariff rate for the United States around 11% before supplier substitution, the highest level since 1943 if the exceptional 2025 episode is excluded. It also warned that the final level would depend on the duration of some temporary measures and the entry into force of new sectoral tariffs.
“Rule-based free trade is a practical condition for reconciling economic integration, fair competition and international stability”
In a context of global value chains, technological transition and capital movements, trade openness benefits when it rests on common rules, effective dispute-resolution mechanisms and reasonable reciprocity conditions. Commercial multilateralism offers precisely that institutional infrastructure, reducing uncertainty, facilitating cooperation among economies and allowing tensions to be channeled within predictable and legitimate procedures. From this perspective, rule-based free trade constitutes a practical condition for reconciling economic integration, fair competition and international stability.
