Two Canadian provinces—Alberta and Quebec—could soon organize referendums on independence. The questions at stake reach beyond provincial borders, touching on the morality of secession and other related topics.
Only a handful of Americans have paid much attention, given the flood of other political headlines. Yet two Canadian provinces—Alberta and Quebec—could be on track to stage referendums about secession in the near term. If such votes occur, the advocates of independence are likely to fall short in both cases. Nevertheless, these episodes remain of interest to scholars of federalism and secession, and to anyone who cares about Canada’s future as a key ally and neighbor. History shows that secessionist movements frequently persist even after a referendum defeat.
In Quebec, the separatist Parti Quebecois (PQ) leads in the polls and is favored to form the government in the forthcoming October provincial election. They vow to hold a secession referendum if they win. Their victory is far from guaranteed, given Quebec’s intricate five-party dynamic and the closeness of recent surveys. The PQ, the Quebec Liberal Party, and the governing Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) are separated by only a few points in the latest polls.
If the PQ captures power and manages to trigger a referendum, the “no” side is very likely to prevail, as occurred in the two previous PQ-led plebiscites in 1980 and 1995. Recent polling shows a “no” lead of roughly 2-to-1. Still, staging a referendum would thrust the issue of Quebec secession back into the heart of Canadian politics and would heighten friction between provincial and federal authorities.
In Alberta, Premier Danielle Smith’s United Conservative Party (UCP) administration has approved a campaign to collect signatures for a secession-linked referendum question on the fall ballot, with voting scheduled for October 19. Yet the question isn’t a straightforward yes-no on secession. It asks voters to decide: “Should Alberta remain a province of Canada, or should the Government of Alberta commence the legal process required under the Canadian Constitution to hold a binding provincial referendum on whether or not Alberta should separate from Canada?” In effect, it is a referendum on whether to hold a referendum!
A recent Angus Reid Institute poll indicates that Albertans would reject the above question by about 60–35, while they would reject a pure secession vote by a wider 67–30 margin. Other surveys show even larger majorities against a direct secession. Apparently, some voters either find the official question confusing or wish to cast a ballot on secession even if they intend to vote “no.”
The motivations behind the two secession movements diverge in important ways. Quebec’s drive is a classic ethno-nationalist project aimed at creating a Francophone majority nation. The CAQ government, in power for eight years, advocates promoting Francophone nationalism without breaking from Canada and has enacted restrictive measures governing English usage in public and commercial life and limiting religious freedom for many public employees and professionals. Critics argue these laws violate the Canadian Constitution’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms; but the CAQ has invoked the Notwithstanding Clause to shield them from judicial review. American critics of judicial review would do well to study the Notwithstanding Clause’s history and consider what forms of repressive policy could appear here if such a device existed. Quebec secessionists argue that these measures are not enough and that only independence would allow their government to execute everything needed to advance Francophone supremacy.
In contrast, the Alberta secessionist push rests almost entirely on ideological and economic grievances. Albertans have little in common with other Anglophone-majority provinces in terms of ethnicity or culture, though the province is the most conservative in Canada. Proponents claim that independence would permit more conservative policies, particularly on economic matters. They also resent the federal transfers that drain Alberta of tax revenue while the federal government often resists authorizing pipelines and other infrastructure to facilitate the export of Alberta’s oil and minerals (the province is a major oil producer).
Not surprisingly, Alberta secessionists are predominantly supporters of the UCP (and of the Conservative Party of Canada in federal elections). This appears to be an ideological movement rather than a linguistics- or ethnicity-driven one.
Regular VC readers should not be surprised to find that I feel somewhat more sympathetic toward Alberta secession than toward Quebec’s. I have elsewhere argued that ethno-nationalism is a dangerous creed that harms liberty and prosperity, and Quebec nationalism is no exception. Quebec’s language- and religion-related laws are repressive, illiberal, and deeply unjust. Secession would likely worsen the situation. While the Notwithstanding Clause cannot shield every constitutional right, it is a limited instrument; an independent Quebec would escape such constraints altogether.
Ethnic secession movements can sometimes be justified when the targeted group endures systemic oppression by the central government seeking to depart. But in the modern era, Francophone Canadians have not faced systematic oppression from Ottawa. The government does not prevent them from using their language, practicing their culture and faith, or experiences widespread discrimination in government jobs or the provision of public services. The primary aim of Quebec’s secessionists appears not to escape oppression from Canada but to gain power to restrict minorities within Quebec.
I used to suppose that without fears of domination by Ottawa, an independent Quebec might be more tolerant toward minority groups than the current Quebec government. Yet the more I study nationalist movements, the less plausible that notion seems. Granting secessionists more power is unlikely to promote restraint; if anything, it tends to do the opposite.
Moreover, although Quebec separatists differ on many issues, they often lean toward economic statism (a common trait of nationalist movements). Consequently, an independent Quebec would probably curtail economic freedom as well as freedom of speech and religion more than today.
By contrast, there is some merit to Alberta secessionists’ grievances about fiscal transfers and pipelines. An independent Alberta could pursue freer-market policies than it does within Canada. Western Canadian conservatism tends to be more libertarian than its American counterpart and is far less marked by the social conservatism and ethnic nationalism that has degraded the political right in the United States in recent years. It also seems unlikely that an independent Alberta would persecute minorities as an independent Quebec might. Thus, it is possible that an autonomous Alberta would be freer and more prosperous than it presently is, though “freer” here is meant in a libertarian sense. Left-leaning critics might view this potential shift as negative rather than positive.
In my prior writings (for example, here and here), I proposed some criteria for evaluating the morality of secession movements. As a general rule, secession is justifiable if a regional majority (or perhaps a supermajority) endorses it, the new government will safeguard human rights (or at least infringe them less than the old rulers), and the new regime is not worse than the existing central government. Quebec’s secession obviously fails this test. Alberta’s secession—if it garners majority backing—could potentially pass.
Nevertheless, I harbor several reservations about Alberta’s push. I doubt that independence would relieve the fiscal and pipeline predicaments; it might even aggravate them. If Ottawa is frequently reluctant to authorize pipelines and related infrastructure now, it would likely become even less accommodating after Alberta becomes sovereign. And landlocked Alberta would be unable to export its goods except through Canada or the United States. While independence would reduce transfers to other provinces, establishing a fully sovereign state would entail new costs; the Alberta government’s current estimates put transition costs at roughly CAD 400 billion and ongoing annual expenses at CAD 25 to 50 billion (at current exchange rates, one Canadian dollar is about USD 0.70–0.75). Even if the real costs are only a fraction of that, the figure remains substantial. The province’s annual budget is presently around CAD 79.3 billion.
Additionally, both Albertans and other Canadians would suffer if free trade and free movement between Alberta and the rump Canadian state vanished. And given the bitterness likely to be generated by a successful secession, there is no guarantee that free trade and mobility would endure indefinitely.
From a U.S. vantage point, I worry that a successful secession movement would leave Canada weaker and a less reliable partner. Unlike the current administration, I believe that a strong western alliance remains essential.
Unless public opinion is wildly off, neither Alberta nor Quebec seems poised to prevail in the near future. Yet even if both movements fail to materialize, or the Quebec plan never comes to fruition, the movements could endure and matter. Quebec’s secessionists have persisted despite two defeats, and Scotland’s drive continued after its 2014 referendum. There are many similar examples around the world. Once the secessionist impulse has been unleashed, it is rarely extinguished except by a decisive military defeat (as with the Confederate case in the United States). For this reason, these two Canadian movements could continue to exert political influence even if victory remains distant.
To sum up, Canada’s twin secession efforts raise a range of important questions with implications beyond these particular situations. Americans and other non-Canadians who care about federalism, secession, and the future of the Western alliance would do well to observe them carefully.
NOTE: Some might consider it inappropriate for an American to weigh in on Canadian politics. I disagree. Canadians and other non-Americans frequently comment on U.S. politics, and they are entitled to do so. The merit of political analysis should be judged by its substance, not by the author’s nationality. Moreover, for reasons noted above, Canadian secessionism could impact the United States in various ways and raises broader questions about the morality of secession movements that Americans and others have reason to consider. FWIW, I have long been an academic expert on federalism and secession-related issues, and I am fluent in both French and English. Thus, I believe I possess the qualifications to write about these topics. Whether this commentary is any good or not is for others to decide.
