On July 30 and 31, as tens of thousands of migrants crossed the Ceuta border, Moroccan warships sailed into Spanish waters. The Navy strengthened its presence in the area, and the incident was eventually resolved through diplomatic contacts between the two countries, as later explained by President Pedro Sánchez. The Government, however, remained silent. For more than two months, the public did not know that the border crisis also had a military dimension. It was not clarified who stood behind the massive influx of migrants. Had naval incursions been revealed at that time, many would have immediately placed the blame on Morocco for the events at the border, even in the absence of sufficient proof.
Sánchez had reasons to prevent the naval episode from souring ties with Rabat. But his decision carried a considerable political risk: that the information would finally be published without the Government having provided any explanation beforehand. And that is what happened. The president managed to keep the crisis within the diplomatic realm, though he left himself open to accusations of concealment. If the incursions had come to light only a few days after the events, with Ceuta’s images still resonating in public discussion, the political consequences would probably have been greater. The revelation arrived later, but forced the Government to retrospectively justify a decision about which it had preferred not to inform.
From Kennedy to Perejil: the lessons of diplomatic restraint
In October 1962, John F. Kennedy faced a problem that, while different in scale, bears some resemblance to Sánchez’s. The United States had discovered that the Soviet Union was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. Kennedy kept the information secret for six days while weighing military and diplomatic options. When he publicly announced the discovery, he had already decided to impose a naval quarantine around the island. The move allowed him to demonstrate resolve without automatically triggering a war. During those days, the silence gave Washington time to prepare its response and prevented a prematurely announced threat from limiting its room for negotiation.
In an international crisis, the publicity of threats can end up conditioning as much as the threats themselves. A decisive statement can satisfy public opinion, but it also commits the speaker. If the adversary is publicly humiliated, accepting a retreat becomes more difficult for them. Diplomacy must preserve that possibility: to let the other side back down without requiring an overt defeat. Hence the power of a state lies as much in its ability to decide when to use it and how far to push a confrontation.
“In an international crisis, the publicity of the threats can end up conditioning as much as the threats themselves”
Thomas Schelling studied precisely the relationship between deterrence and negotiation. The threat of using force may be necessary to defend particular interests, but it loses much of its usefulness when there are no alternatives to confrontation. Spain could answer militarily to the Moroccan incursions and, at the same time, try to prevent each move from demanding an even stronger response. Turning the episode publicly into a test of authority would have reduced the Government’s room to pursue a discreet solution.
Of course, Cuba and Ceuta are very different situations. Spain was not facing a nuclear war, nor does Morocco pose a threat comparable to the Soviet Union in 1962. What matters about the American precedent is the management of political timing. Kennedy delayed the disclosure to prepare a response. In Ceuta, the Spanish Government appears to have chosen discretion to prevent the naval incursion from aggravating a crisis that was already enormously serious.
Spain has another, closer precedent: the Perejil islet. In July 2002, José María Aznar ordered a military operation to expel Moroccan troops who had occupied it. Spain regained control through armed intervention, but the confrontation later required mediation by the United States to restore the previous situation. The military action ended the occupation; without that diplomatic exit, Madrid–Rabat relations could have continued on a downward spiral.
Perejil also does not permit the conclusion that Spain should have renounced intervention. The military response could be justified, although by itself it did not guarantee a political solution. That distinction gains particular significance among neighboring countries. Spain and Morocco share borders, economic interests, police cooperation, and migration responsibilities. They can undergo serious crises, but they will still have to relate to one another once the crisis passes. Even when a confrontation is resolved, its effects on bilateral trust can linger for years.
“Even when a confrontation is resolved, its effects on bilateral trust can linger for years”
It is also necessary to consider how each Government interprets the other’s moves. A measure taken to strengthen one’s own security can be perceived on the other side of the border as a threat and provoke a response that makes the situation even worse. Diplomatic restraint helps interrupt that chain of reactions. It is possible, therefore, to interpret Spain’s actions in Ceuta as a bid to defend sovereignty with a proportionate military response, without escalating the conflict any more than necessary.
This prudence should be taken into account when weighing the demands of those who call for Spain to publicly name Morocco as responsible for what happened. The Government can and should face criticism for its handling, for the delay in responding, or for keeping silent about the incursions for too long. Accountability is part of democratic control. But formally declaring that Morocco carried out a deliberate aggression against Spain would have consequences far beyond a political accusation.
An accusation of that kind would raise expectations of a response. Spain could be pressured to suspend part of the bilateral cooperation, push for European sanctions, or carry out new military demonstrations. Morocco, in turn, could react to any of those measures. The risk of an escalation is evident, even if neither government wishes to go that far. In foreign policy, words can create commitments difficult to withdraw. Once a public accusation is made, rectifying it or reducing its intensity also carries a political cost.
“In foreign policy, words can create obligations difficult to withdraw. Once a public accusation is made, rectifying it or reducing its intensity also carries a political cost”
Of course, the need to maintain good relations with Morocco does not require granting it diplomatic immunity. Spain must be able to denounce Rabat’s actions when there are grounds to do so. The demand for explanations from the Spanish Government, however, can be sustained without necessarily seeking a public confrontation with the neighboring country. Before calling for tougher measures, it would be wise to clarify what is sought to be achieved, what reaction those measures might provoke, and what options remain to resolve the conflict.
In Ceuta, moreover, it is useful to distinguish between threats of very different natures. Spain’s obligation to guarantee its sovereignty and control its borders does not make the arrival of civilians a problem comparable to a military incursion. Nor does it authorize the indiscriminate use of lethal force against migrants. The State’s response must conform to the law and be proportionate to each situation. Demanding maximum force in response to any border incident, regardless of its characteristics, can lead to dangerous decisions.
The visit of Felipe VI to Ceuta and Morocco’s internal tensions
The visit of Felipe VI and Letizia to Ceuta, on October 13, allowed expressing Spain’s position without the need for new military demonstrations. The king defended the autonomous city’s sovereignty, reminded that its border is also European, and urged a relationship with Morocco based on mutual respect. The institutional message combined territorial firmness with a willingness to maintain stable ties with Rabat.
“The obligation of Spain to guarantee its sovereignty and control its borders does not make the arrival of civilians a problem comparable to a military incursion”
Just a few days earlier, Ignacio Cembrero had anticipated in an interview with Agenda Pública that Morocco’s anger over the visit would be less than that provoked by King Juan Carlos I’s trip in 2007. He believed Rabat had reasons to avoid Ceuta’s crisis continuing to damage its international image. The relatively restrained reaction of Moroccan authorities so far seems to point in that direction. He also notes that the political reach of a royal visit depends on the neighbor country’s circumstances and on those who govern it.
The Moroccan internal circumstances deserve attention as well. When the Ceuta crisis erupted, less than two months remained before the September 23 parliamentary elections, held amid broad social discontent, especially among the youth. Added to that was the uncertainty about the future of the Alaouite monarchy. Mohamed VI continued to perform his duties, but there was no formally opened succession process, though rumors circulated about a possible transition to his son, Prince Mulay Hasan, alongside information about rivalries and power struggles within the Royal Palace.
These factors matter because major Moroccan strategic decisions continue to depend on the monarch. An escalation in diplomacy with Spain could unfold amid social tensions, recalibrations of power, and succession expectations whose scope is hard to gauge from outside. It would be premature to claim that any of these circumstances motivated the naval incursions in July or to attribute them to a particular faction within the regime. There is not enough information to determine it.
The uncertainty, precisely, counsels prudence. When the distribution of power in the neighboring country is not known with precision, predicting internal consequences of an external confrontation becomes difficult. A Spanish response designed to project firmness could end up benefiting those within the Moroccan system who see value in keeping the conflict alive. Spain has a clear interest in the stability of the country with which it shares its southern border. Avoiding a bilateral crisis from fueling possible internal power struggles is also a consideration worth noting.
Sánchez’s silence and the limits of diplomatic discretion
That external caution has, however, consequences at home in Spain. Sánchez could provoke a reaction from Rabat if he disclosed the incursions, but silence exposed him to accusations of withholding relevant information. The president confirmed the incident on October 12, once it had appeared in the press. In his September parliamentary appearance he had not mentioned what happened, an omission that deserves explanations.
“A Spanish response designed to demonstrate firmness could end up benefiting those within the Moroccan system who see it as useful to keep the confrontation open”
There are reasons a Government might delay disclosing certain military information while managing a security crisis. It can also be used to avoid political responsibility. Distinguishing between those two possibilities requires knowing what happened, why the decision to stay silent was taken, and for how long such silence was justified. No Government can reveal all its military movements while they are underway, but national security cannot become a permanent excuse to dodge democratic oversight. Discretion during a crisis must be followed by accountability afterward.
The political wear on Sánchez from managing Ceuta has been substantial. His late response, coupled with the opposition’s use of the crisis, has also imposed a particularly heavy cost on Spanish society: the spread of racist discourse in public debate. The Government’s refusal to formally assign responsibility for what happened to Morocco has been interpreted by some as a betrayal. Yet, that decision may also reflect a willingness to preserve bilateral relations that Spain needs to maintain, without necessarily yielding to Moroccan interests.
Assessing Sánchez’s actions will depend on the outcomes. It will be necessary to determine whether the Navy’s response effectively protected Spanish sovereignty, whether it prevented further incursions, and whether discretion helped restore a stable relationship with Morocco. The Government will also have to explain why it kept the episode out of the public sphere for more than two months.
“National security cannot become a permanent excuse to evade democratic oversight”
Kennedy had six days to prepare his response to the Soviet Union. In Perejil, Spain required mediation after military intervention. Ceuta presents its own circumstances, but it once again reminds us that a show of force can resolve an incident without guaranteeing the end of a crisis. Sánchez chose to avoid a public confrontation with Morocco. Now he must explain why he did so and demonstrate that that prudence served Spain’s interests.
