The resumption of activity in Brussels has arrived accompanied by major headlines about the EU’s foreign policy: the Member States left the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers —the so-called “Gymnich”— held in Wicklow, Ireland, with new proposals to reform the European External Action Service (EEAS).
For those of us working on this issue, it is excellent news that, at last, there seems to be a serious reflection in the Council on the model and on the real distribution of the EU’s external competences.
“It’s excellent news that, at last, there seems to be a serious reflection in the Council on the model and on the real distribution of the EU’s external competences”
This is precisely what I have been insisting on for many years: that this debate takes place. The dynamics of this turf war between institutions imply that the Commission is quietly gaining ground on the EEAS, little by little and without a comprehensive assessment being carried out. That’s why these reflections within the Council are more than welcome.
The debate now centers on how to improve the coordination and coherence of the EU’s foreign policy in the face of the so-called “duplications”.
Duplications, but who created them?
However, the question should not be whether duplications exist, but who created them—and who allowed them to be created—over time. Because it was the European Commission that expanded the geographic scope of its directorates-general. It handed to the Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič, all aspects of the EU’s relations with the United Kingdom, not only trade.
“The question should not be whether duplications exist, but who created them—and who allowed them to be created—over time”
It also planned to create a second intelligence cell in the Secretariat-General, distinct from the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre —the INTCEN of the European External Action Service—, and a “Security College” that duplicates the Council’s Political and Security Committee. Furthermore, the Commission attended the inaugural session of the Peace Board without a mandate to do so.
The justification for these duplications is simple: they exist because the Commission had a budget, while the EEAS did not. And now it is the Commission itself that, once these duplications have been established, draws attention to how undesirable, inconvenient and inefficient they are and asks the Council to put an end to them.
In recent years, the EU’s budgetary logic in foreign policy has become a “constitutional mutation”. In other words, instead of assigning competencies first and funding them later, there is an informal allocation of competencies to the institution that has the money to exercise them, without amending the treaties.
Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that there has been a deliberate strategy to financially strangle the EEAS, so that the Commission would gain de facto ground in the EU’s foreign policy.
Psychological Fatigue
This situation has, in turn, caused psychological fatigue among the excellent EEAS professionals who feel that their work is futile because they lack the resources necessary to perform it properly. Moreover, it has broader consequences for the European Union’s presence in the world.
I am not unconditionally defending the current model: it may be necessary to change it. However, the current dynamic of silent “budgetary subjugation” is simply unacceptable. We must clearly decide who does what and, afterward, adequately fund the responsible institution.
That process must necessarily involve the Council, the Commission, the EEAS, and the European Parliament, in order to guarantee proper democratic oversight.