Four years ago, Chancellor Scholz announced a “turning point”. Since then, the continent has not asked whether it should strive and reinforce its defense. European countries know it and now question whether they have truly grasped the scope of this supposed transformation. The response to the second Russian invasion of Ukraine in the twenty-first century is that Spain has done more, but it’s not clear that it thinks in a sufficiently different way from how it did before 2022.
The German concept (Zeitenwende) referred to something more than a budget increase or a reaction to the war’s circumstances, no matter how intense it was. It signaled a revolution of the mental framework in which European states — starting with Germany itself — had to understand their security, their vulnerabilities and their role in a more aggressive and more competitive international arena.
What does the ‘Zeitenwende’ really mean for Spain?
Indeed, Spain has increased its defense-budgeted spending, has maintained or increased its participation on the so-called “eastern flank,” and publicly presents itself as a committed ally in NATO and in the EU —Spain, moreover, amid serious troubles with the United States—. All of that matters. However, the magnitude of the European shift demands something more than merely late compliance with commitments made more than a decade ago and continuing the path of international participation under the umbrella of the “reliable partner”.
“The present requires specifying what military capabilities are contributed, what risks are assumed and what role is to be played in a defence of Europe”
The present requires specifying what military capabilities are contributed, what risks are assumed and what role is to be played in a defence of Europe that will depend less on Atlantic inertia (in two states that had maintained —and perhaps still maintain?— a supposedly strong Atlantic vocation with the North American power) and more on the tangible will of Europe itself. Spain runs the risk of being placed on the margins of that debate. The reason is that it does not decide, to its fullest consequences, what the new strategic situation means.
That the Russian threat is not perceived the same in Tallinn, Warsaw, Lisbon or Madrid is already a commonplace. The “threat balance,” whereby states form military alliances to defend themselves against the country they perceive as the greatest threat to their security and not against the country that accumulates the most power, is the accelerator of this phenomenon. For the Spanish Government, for example, which wields a pro-European discourse based on European values and the European Union project, it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain reluctance toward greater defense ambition on the grounds of geographic distance, when what is at stake is the continuity of the very “European house”.
For our allies, the defense of democracy, human rights and the rules-based liberal order becomes hollow if there are no material power instruments (military, but not only) to back them. This logic, outlined by my Vilnius University colleague Margarita Seselgyte in Valencia, perfectly reflects the spirit of this new era.
From Spain we run the risk of turning geographic distance into strategic distance. The war in Ukraine has altered the other balance, the balance of power, on the European continent; continuing to read this change as if it affected only others is a misinterpretation.
“The 2% has become a political target that is still communicated as if it were enough to demonstrate adaptation to the new scenario”
Thus, we announced our arrival at the 2% defense spending target. This is, welcome to 2014. As positive as it may be, given budgetary and fiscal constraints, I disagree with Ignacio Molina’s assessment when he celebrated this achievement by comparing the growth with respect to G20 countries or other forums not exclusively European. Since we are talking about Europe, the most appropriate assessment should be made with respect to European allies: there, the position in the rankings is far from positive for Spain. The horizon of 3% defense spending was not American pressure, but a metric shared by the majority of partners; that was the consensus before The Hague. Nor is it useful to measure that growth in absolute volume, since the question is who punches above their weight and, in that regard, Spain does not. In short, the 2% has become a political target that is still communicated as if it were enough to demonstrate adaptation to the new scenario.
Not all spending carries the same meaning. Salary increases, emergency-related expenditures or dual-use allocations may be legitimate and necessary, but they do not automatically answer the central question: what additional military capabilities does Spain generate for the defense of Europe (air defense, mobility, command and control, electronic warfare, logistical sustainment, drones…), especially if it is true that we want to “replace” the American contribution. It does not seem we are mentally prepared for a “crisis or war” scenario, paraphrasing the document published by the Swedish government.
The eastern flank and the risk of turning solidarity into political signaling
Nor does every military deployment abroad carry the same meaning. Spain presents its involvement on the eastern flank as a test of its commitment. There are reasons to underline it, indeed. But this display of solidarity and trust remains a political signal when neither the debate on the role of our forces addresses all the consequences of such deployments, nor is the publicly acknowledged friction scenario in the gray zone in which we find ourselves openly admitted. The terms in which we justify our presence in Lithuania or Latvia remain virtually unchanged. 2014 continues to live in our mental framework on this front as well.
“The correct question is whether their understanding of defense and the era we are going through has changed”
In conclusion, the question is not only whether Spain spends more or deploys more. The correct question is whether its understanding of defense and the era we are going through has changed. If the answer remains to meet minimums — some of which were signed more than a decade ago — to modulate the language to avoid internal costs and to trust that others will sustain the center of gravity of European defense, then there will be no true Zeitenwende. There has been reaction and many inertial moves, seeking partial adaptation. But not a complete strategic transformation.
The Mediterranean, the Sahel or the Atlantic should not disappear from the Spanish or European agenda. But they cannot serve as an argument to treat the Russian threat as a matter of secondary order. Madrid must properly read, from its supposedly European commitment, the transformation we are living through. And act accordingly.
