After two months of war, the United States and Iran are negotiating almost the same as before the conflict. While Donald Trump insists that the talks are progressing, in Tehran distrust prevails and Iranian authorities accuse Washington of seeking Tehran’s surrender. Although returning to the table can be read as a hopeful sign, there are few reasons to think these negotiations will resolve issues that have been debated for years. After two months of war among the United States, Israel, and Iran, what has really changed?
The short answer is that, essentially, very little. The discussions between the parties revolve around the exact same elements as before the conflict: the Iranian nuclear program, its ballistic capabilities, and its role in the region. But there is something more troubling: if Trump’s objective was to force concessions by force, the outcome points in the opposite direction. Far from having moderated Iran’s demands, this war has hardened them. Consequently, Tehran not only continues to claim the right to develop its nuclear program, but has added a new element to the equation: the control of the Strait of Hormuz as a bargaining chip.
“A regime that barely two months ago was perceived as weakened returns to the negotiating table with positions as maximalist or more so than before the conflict”
This point is fundamental. Iran has not completely closed the strait, but has shown that it can create enough disruption to raise the economic cost of the conflict on a regional and global scale. That capacity, which some analysts interpret as the basis of Iran’s renewed regional power, is now translated into leverage at the negotiating table. This explains why a regime that barely two months ago was perceived as weakened domestically and in the region returns to negotiations with positions as maximalist or even more than before the conflict. Thus, paradoxically, the war seems to have strengthened Iran’s position in the negotiations.
Viewed from the logic of an asymmetric conflict, this apparent contradiction ceases to be a contradiction. For Iran, the weaker actor, surviving this war already constitutes a form of victory. It does not need to impose itself militarily to strengthen its position; it is enough to endure and demonstrate that the cost of subduing it is too high. For the United States, not achieving its objectives is equivalent to losing because its military superiority only makes sense if it translates into concrete political results. In this context, returning to negotiations highlights the failure of coercion: the U.S. returns to the table because it has not achieved what it sought through force. But this does not mean that Trump has adjusted his objectives, as he continues trying to impose his terms on Iran.
“For the American president, negotiation is not a process aimed at bringing positions closer, but another tool within a logic of pressure”
Here lies a second problem, less visible but equally decisive: the incompatibility between the ways of negotiating. For the American president, negotiation is not a process aimed at bringing positions closer, but another tool within a logic of pressure. War is not avoided by negotiating; negotiations occur when war has not produced the expected results. And Trump does so with the same logic as war. In other words, he seeks to obtain a quick victory, which can be exploited politically and, as far as possible, to humiliate the adversary. This pattern has repeated in recent weeks. Trump presented the April 8 ceasefire as the result of effective pressure on Iran and tried to present it as a sign of weakness of the Islamic Republic. Soon after, when Tehran announced the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, Washington, far from interpreting it as a gesture of goodwill, understood it as confirmation that his strategy was working. And when Iran again hardened its position in the strait, the American response was to raise the tone and threaten new military actions. The sequence is always the same: pressure, victory announcement, new pressure. This erratic and impulsive pattern introduces a degree of unpredictability that makes sustained negotiation over time difficult. Moreover, this logic breaks with Tehran’s. As reflected by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) —after more than a decade of negotiations—, Iranian diplomats are more about long processes (sometimes endless), extremely detailed and technical, and in which every word counts.
Why guarantees keep blocking a deal with Iran
In addition, for Iran, the objective goes beyond meticulously negotiating the terms of the agreement, because it wants guarantees. And for there to be guarantees, there must be a minimum level of trust between the parties. That minimum does not exist today. It is worth recalling that, in less than a year, the Islamic Republic was attacked twice by the United States and Israel amid negotiations that seemed promising. Thus, for Tehran, the fear that the United States and Tel Aviv will use negotiations as a tactical pause is not a hypothesis, but a recent precedent. Hence the head of Iran’s negotiating team, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, acknowledged that Tehran does not trust the U.S. and takes for granted that fighting could resume at any moment, even during negotiations.
“American demands on nuclear matters imply lasting, if not irreversible, commitments, while the concessions offered can be reversed with some ease”
This context explains why Iran insists on firm guarantees and avoids concessions that are hard to reverse. This insistence is due to another structural problem of the negotiation that the Islamic Republic is trying to overcome: the asymmetry between concessions and guarantees. U.S. demands on nuclear matters — handing over or eliminating the stock of uranium — entail lasting, if not irreversible, commitments, while the concessions offered — lifting sanctions or unfreezing assets — can be reversed rather easily. It is worth remembering that the current war has its origins in Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. In light of that precedent, for Tehran this exchange of irreversible concessions for reversible concessions amounts to taking on a guaranteed cost in exchange for an uncertain benefit.
Under these conditions, the room for compromise is extremely narrow and it is even narrower after two months of war. In other words, the problem is that the premises of both actors remain fundamentally incompatible. Tehran’s stance remains the same and the war has revealed its capacity to disrupt the region, in Hormuz and in the global economy, thereby reinforcing incentives to maintain its position. In parallel, Trump — guided by the belief that force solves everything — continues betting on economic and military pressure with the expectation that Iran will yield. Between these premises, there is no real basis for a commitment that addresses the underlying issues.
Therefore, while the premises of each side remain the same, the ceasefire cannot be anything but precarious. The only element that invites some optimism is that, despite the tensions in Hormuz, the ceasefire holds. This suggests that both sides currently prefer to avoid a further escalation due to the accumulated costs. The balance could lead to a prolonged truce without an agreement: an indefinite pause that allows Trump to declare a costly war over without having solved the underlying problem, while Iran keeps its main levers of pressure without obtaining the economic relief it needs. It is not a satisfactory outcome for either side, but it is capable of being presented as a political success by both sides.
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