The Welfare State was born from a concrete concern: to respond to the needs of the disadvantaged population. At the end of the 19th century, Bismarck promoted in Germany the first social insurances to protect workers against accidents, illness, disability, or old age. Decades later, Sir William Beveridge, a member of the Economics Faculty at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), took that intuition further: it was not enough to cover a few occupational risks; a system capable of offering security against life’s major contingencies had to be built, and to do so with a broader, almost universal vocation. On this basis emerges the modern idea of the Welfare State: a pact by which the State intervenes to ensure the general welfare of the population, improve income distribution, and guarantee equal opportunities.
Spain gradually incorporated that promise: first, in 1963, with the unification of social insurances and the creation of Social Security; then, with the 1978 Constitution, the principle of universality of social protection was introduced; and finally, in 1990, non-contributory benefits were recognized. However, half a century later, it is worth asking whether the Welfare State needs to be revised, expanded, or strengthened where social needs have changed. This poses a necessary question: if the Welfare State was born to accompany us throughout life, is it today responding with the same effectiveness to the risks faced by all generations?
“It is worth asking whether the Welfare State needs to be revised, expanded, or strengthened where social needs have changed”
To answer this question, one must evaluate how social protection is currently distributed and what risks it covers. The Spanish system was built around very concrete contingencies, especially old age and illness, to which it responds efficiently. Eurostat data from 2024 show that, for every euro of social protection, around 42 cents go to old age and barely 5 or 6 to family and children; housing gets just under half a cent.
Dicho reparto es el reflejo de cómo se diseñó el sistema en su momento; España protege a sus mayores de manera similar a la que lo hacen nuestros países vecinos. Dedica a la vejez una proporción muy parecida a la media europea, entre el 12% y el 14% del PIB. La diferencia aparece en las primeras etapas de la vida: en infancia y familia se invierte poco más de la mitad que la media de la Unión Europea (un 1,4% del PIB frente a un 2,4%).
According to Eurostat data, in 2004 people aged 65 or older were the age group with the highest risk of poverty in Spain: 29.8% were below the relative poverty threshold, that is, with incomes below 60% of the country’s median income adjusted for household size. However, in 2025, the poverty risk rate among those under 16 stood at 28.5%, while among those over 65 it had fallen to 16.4%. This change should not be interpreted as a generational dispute, but as the reflection of an institutional architecture that protects with varying intensity according to life stage. The reduction of poverty in old age constitutes an important achievement of the Welfare State; the problem is not in that success, but in the fact that protection against other risks seems to have progressed to a lesser extent. From this perspective, the generational orientation of Welfare States is not explained so much by an open struggle between young and old as by institutional decisions taken long before: the design of social programs, the groups they protected, and the risks deemed priorities at each moment.
Ese desajuste se aprecia con especial claridad entre los jóvenes. No porque hayan hecho menos méritos, ni porque hayan invertido menos en su futuro. De hecho, ocurre lo contrario. El 53% de los españoles de entre 25 y 34 años tiene estudios superiores, por encima de la media de la Unión Europea (44%). Sin embargo, esa mejora educativa no se ha traducido en una entrada más segura en el mercado laboral. According to the latest Eurostat annual employment statistics, in 2025 34% of Spanish workers held a job below their level of qualification, compared to the EU average of 21.4%. In other words, many young people have followed the path they were asked to take, but at the end of that journey they find jobs that do not always recognize that investment.
“La orientación generacional de los Estados del Bienestar no se explica tanto por una pugna abierta entre jóvenes y mayores como por decisiones institucionales tomadas mucho antes”
A ello se suma una tasa de paro juvenil persistentemente superior a la europea. According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Economy, among those under 25, unemployment reached 24.1% for men and 25.8% for women in Spain, versus 15.3% and 15.1% respectively in the EU-27. But precarity is not only expressed in the difficulty of finding a job, but also in the quality of the jobs available. Four out of ten young wage earners are stuck in temporary contracts and, at the same age, earn about 20% less than the generation of their parents, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The result is a paradox difficult to ignore: a more educated generation, but with more uncertain career paths, lower wages and less ability to build an autonomous life plan.
A esta precariedad laboral se suma el problema de la vivienda, que dificulta aún más la emancipación de los jóvenes. En España, los jóvenes se emancipan cerca de los 30 años, casi cuatro años más tarde que la media europea, en un contexto en el que los precios han aumentado alrededor de un 90% desde 2015. La dificultad de acceso a la vivienda no es ya un problema coyuntural ni una etapa transitoria de la juventud; se ha convertido en uno de los principales mecanismos de reproducción de la desigualdad. Quien cuenta con apoyo familiar, patrimonio heredado o capacidad de endeudamiento parte con ventaja. Quien no lo tiene queda atrapado durante más tiempo en la dependencia familiar, el alquiler inestable o la renuncia a formar un hogar propio.
The housing problem further adds to labor precarity, making young people’s emancipation even harder. In Spain, young people leave the parental home around age 30, nearly four years later than the EU average, in a context where prices have risen by roughly 90% since 2015. The difficulty of accessing housing is no longer a temporary problem or a phase of youth; it has become one of the main mechanisms for reproducing inequality. Those who have family support, inherited wealth, or the capacity to borrow start with an advantage. Those who do not are trapped longer in family dependence, unstable renting, or the decision to forgo forming their own home.
El Estado del Bienestar español cuenta con pocas herramientas para responder a este problema. El parque de vivienda social en alquiler apenas representa entre el 2% y el 3% del total, muy por debajo de la media europea, situada en torno al 8%. Para converger simplemente a esa media, España necesitaría construir más de 850.000 viviendas adicionales destinadas al alquiler social. Asimismo, el Banco de España calcula un déficit acumulado de aproximadamente 600.000 viviendas entre 2022 y 2025, en un contexto en el que los permisos de construcción se sitúan sistemáticamente por debajo de la creación neta de hogares.
The Spanish Welfare State has few tools to respond to this problem. The stock of social rental housing represents only about 2% to 3% of the total, well below the European average of around 8%. To simply converge to that average, Spain would need to build more than 850,000 additional homes for social rental. Likewise, the Bank of Spain estimates an accumulated deficit of around 600,000 homes between 2022 and 2025, in a context where construction permits consistently lag behind net household formation.
“Para converger hacia la media europea de parque público, España necesitaría construir más de 850.000 viviendas adicionales destinadas al alquiler social”
Let us return, then, to the starting question. The Spanish Welfare State continues to fulfill an important part of its promise: it protects certain moments of the life cycle, especially old age. However, it is less prepared to respond to the problems that today hinder the start of adult life: entering the labor market, access to housing, emancipation, and the formation of new households. In that gap lies generational inequality: those who are starting their adult life today do so under more difficult conditions than previous generations, despite having more education.
Actualizar el Estado del Bienestar no consiste, por tanto, en enfrentar a jóvenes y mayores, sino en corregir un desequilibrio. No se trata de proteger menos la vejez, sino de proteger mejor las primeras etapas de la vida. Eso exige reforzar tres frentes: el apoyo a la infancia y a las familias, un mercado de trabajo que ofrezca estabilidad y salarios dignos a los jóvenes, y una política de vivienda que haga posible la emancipación. Beveridge imaginó un sistema capaz de acompañar a las personas de principio a fin. Cumplir hoy esa promesa exige proteger las etapas más tempranas del ciclo vital con la misma determinación con la que se protege su final.
Updating the Welfare State, therefore, does not mean pitting young and old against one another, but correcting an imbalance. It is not about protecting less old age, but protecting better the early stages of life. This requires strengthening three fronts: support for childhood and families, a labor market that offers stability and decent wages to the young, and a housing policy that makes emancipation possible. Beveridge imagined a system capable of accompanying people from cradle to grave. Fulfilling that promise today requires protecting the earliest stages of the life cycle with the same determination with which we protect its end.
In collaboration with the “la Caixa” Foundation
In collaboration with the “la Caixa” Foundation
