Without Trust, There Is No Happiness or Good Politics

June 26, 2026

One of the fundamental pillars of social life is trust in others, and especially in institutions. The life in society would be impossible if we followed the advice of Trump to his son: “don’t trust anyone”. Each day, almost automatically, we act trusting others. We trust that other people will continue to follow traffic rules and will stop their vehicle at a red light; we trust that the bus driver will stop to pick up passengers at the designated stop; we trust that what a teacher teaches is truthful and not spreading hoaxes; we trust that a political representative will act guided by the common good. In other words, nearly every action of our lives is embedded in a web of shared expectations. To a greater or lesser extent, we trust what in the social sciences is called the “generalized other” (the expression comes from G. H. Mead).

“Each one of us could find solid arguments to support that trust in others and in institutions can generate happiness”

Distrust is a phenomenon that erodes social life. Imagine if we did not trust that driver, that teacher, etc. Without the fabric of trust, life would not only be much harder and more uncertain, but we would probably be much unhappier.

In a July 2025 survey, Spaniards were asked to place themselves on a 0-10 happiness scale and also to indicate whether they think others will take advantage of them or whether people are generally honest (an indicator of generalized trust on a 0-10 scale). There is a modest statistically significant association (0.329, p < ? ) between feeling happy and trusting others. Although we cannot establish causality, each of us could find solid arguments to sustain that trust in others and institutions can generate happiness.

The Trust and Institutions

On average, Spaniards see themselves as happier (mean 6.67) than as trusting (mean 4.59). While 60% report being very happy (scores 7-10 on the scale), 9% sit at the opposite end (scores 0-3). Conversely, trusting individuals are less common (32%) than those who believe that others would not deceive them (23%). The most distrustful are citizens who report having voted for Vox (3.79 mean on the scale), while the most trusting are declared voters for the PP (4.99) followed by PSOE (4.85) and the voters of the Sumar space (4.71).

In this generic context, it should come as no surprise that trust in some basic institutions of our country is rather low, although there are nuances, as noted in another piece. The survey asks for the personal placement on a 0-10 trust scale for some institutions. The public trusts more in the security forces (FFCCS, 6.14 average), followed by the Judiciary (4.78), the Crown (4.59) and business organizations (4.51). They tend to trust less in the media (4.19), unions (3.85) and two institutions key to the functioning of democracy: the Congress of Deputies (3.83) and political parties (3.37). In short, we are not exactly overflowing with institutional trust.



In the same line, there are nuances that point to an ideological alignment in trust in institutions. If we disregard the cross-cutting trust granted to the FFCCS, it becomes evident that PP and Vox voters, with slightly different intensities, place their trust more in the Crown, the business sector, and the Judicial Power. By contrast, for voters declared for PSOE and the Sumar/Podemos space, there is greater plurality. For both groups, unions and the Congress are holders of more trust, but PSOE voters place more trust in the Judicial Power and Sumar/Podemos voters in the media.

“There are nuances that point to ideological alignment in trust in institutions: PP and Vox and PSOE with Podemos/Sumar have similar records”

Let us pause a moment to see who, on average, trusts the least. Among declared PP and Vox voters, the institutions they trust the least are the unions and the parties — and the Congress is added among Vox’s electorate. Among PSOE voters, trust is lower in the business sector and the parties, although the overall average remains high. In fact, these are the voters with the highest average level of trust. And in the Sumar/Podemos space there is considerable distrust of the business sector, and above all, of the Crown.

The Institutional Erosion

Probably, we cannot speak of a Habermasian crisis of legitimacy, but when large swaths of the population distrust key institutions in democracies—and when this distrust is also embedded in ideological divisions—there are problems for which the “bearing” of Ortega y Gasset may not be enough.

The instrumentalization (manipulation, colonization, utilization, capture, subordination) of institutions does a poor favor to building public trust, as it can end up eroding their legitimacy, and I fear that the political hooliganism in which we live and which Mariano Torcal has studied, contributes to seeing and judging reality with eyes not critical, but colored by political or ideological affection, which contributes to the growing polarization also studied by Luis Miller. If this is the case, and given the disastrous consequences of distrust in democratic politics, perhaps it would be wise to think about how to try to deflate the political stage. Any ideas?

Natalie Foster

I’m a political writer focused on making complex issues clear, accessible, and worth engaging with. From local dynamics to national debates, I aim to connect facts with context so readers can form their own informed views. I believe strong journalism should challenge, question, and open space for thoughtful discussion rather than amplify noise.